FLASH GROWTH ESTIMATES USING CALENDAR INFORMATION

In 1991 Statistics Netherlands introduced their early flash estimates of the Quarterly National Accounts. In this article we examine a new, faster flash estimate, some three to four weeks earlier. The gain is made by using a simple regression technique and incomplete data. To compensate for the lack of data, information on the number of working days and shopping days was added to the regression. The inclusion of these calendar aspects significantly affect GDP growth: 0.30 percent point extra GDP growth for one extra working day, and 0.17 percent point for one extra shopping day.
The cost of an earlier estimate is a decrease of reliability. The probability of a forecast error of over 0.5 percent point will be about 26 percent, compared to 12 percent for the official flash estimate.     

Life Sciences Roundtable: Strategy and Financing

In light of the challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, a distinguished group of pharma executives and strategic and financial advisers discusses the following corporate decisions:

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CEOs are in a bind with Wall Street. Managers up and down the hierarchy work hard at putting together plans and budgets for the next year only to discover that the bottom line falls far short of Wall Street's expectations. CEOs and CFOs are therefore left in a difficult situation; they can stretch to try to meet Wall Street's projections or prepare to suffer the consequences if they fail.
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