Highly Valued Equity and Discretionary Accruals

Abstract:  Overvalued equity provides a strong incentive for managers to report earnings that do not disappoint the market (  Jensen, 2005 ). We find that this can be extended to highly valued equity more generally. In the year following the classification as highly valued and compared to firms with less extreme valuations, highly valued firms have significantly higher discretionary accruals and exhibit a more pronounced positive association between discretionary accruals and proxies for the likelihood of failing to meet earnings targets. These findings are consistent with the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings in support of extreme valuation. Because highly valued equity will likely result in CEOs with valuable stock and stock option portfolios, we test whether and show that the overvalued equity incentive is incremental to a CEO's equity portfolio incentive. One implication is that directors and audit committees should be especially on guard for possible earnings management when a firm has extremely high valuation multiples and when the CEO has a lot of equity at risk.     

Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?

We analyze 1,607 investors who switched from phone-based toonline trading during the 1990s. Those who switch to onlinetrading perform well prior to going online, beating the marketby more than 2% annually. After going online, they trade moreactively, more speculatively, and less profitably than before—laggingthe market by more than 3% annually. Reductions in market frictions(lower trading costs, improved execution speed, and greaterease of access) do not explain these findings. Overconfidence—augmentedby self-attribution bias and the illusions of knowledge andcontrol—can explain the increase in trading and reductionin performance of online investors.     

Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average

People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.     

Managing the Risk of European Corn Borer Resistance to Bt Corn

New pesticidal crops are taking advantage of advances in geneticengineering. For example, corn has been engineered to express Bt proteinsthat are toxic to the European corn borer. These crops are effective pestmanagement tools for United States growers. However, there is concern thatpests will develop resistance to these crops resulting in the increased useof more hazardous pesticides. The purpose of this paper is to develop astochastic dynamic bioeconomic simulation model to help guide regulatorypolicy designed to mitigate the threat of resistance to new pesticidal crops.The model is used to evaluate the insect resistance management guidelinesmandated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency for theuse of Bt corn in the Midwestern United States.     

Systematic noise

We analyze trading records for 66,465 households at a large discount broker and 665,533 investors at a large retail broker to document that the trading of individuals is highly correlated and persistent. This systematic trading of individual investors is not primarily driven by passive reactions to institutional herding, by systematic changes in risk-aversion, or by taxes. Psychological biases likely contribute to the correlated trading of individuals. These biases lead investors to systematically buy stocks with strong recent performance, to refrain from selling stocks held for a loss, and to be net buyers of stocks with unusually high trading volume.     

EVOLVING A THEORY OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED LOGISTICS USING INSIGHTS FROM SERVICE DOMINANT LOGIC

Performance‐based logistics (PBL) represents a strategy for sustaining complex systems following production. Despite several implementations, limited understanding exists regarding PBL and its implications. Research using grounded theory emerged a theoretical framework for PBL. Service dominant logic (SDL) is introduced as a theoretical lens for interpreting the results and understanding how trading partners achieve performance‐based outcomes.     

Buyer opportunism in business-to-business exchange

A phenomenon of significance in buyer–supplier relationships is opportunism. In lieu of the known negative effects of opportunistic behavior on buyer–supplier relationships, the circumstances in which a sourcing professional engages in acts of opportunism are unclear. Combining theories from multiple disciplines, a comprehensive model tested buyer–supplier relationship-specific factors, environmental factors, an individual-difference factor, and situational factors likely to affect a buyer's decision to use opportunistic tactics. Results reveal how these different theories combine to provide a more comprehensive explanation of buyer behavior than existed in prior literature. Using structural equation modeling of a sample of 328 procurement transactions, factors found to affect buyer opportunism included buyer power, corporate ethical values, honesty/integrity, leader opportunism, willful ignorance, and subjective expected utility. This study also provides empirical support for distinguishing between two types of opportunism — strong and weak. The research concludes with implications for theory and practice, limitations, and areas for future research.     

Asymmetric information contests

We consider how asymmetries in information affect contest behavior. We find two effects drive behavior-risk and perceptions of an opponent's value. Our results also suggest that the more tractable one-sided asymmetric information contest might be sufficient to capture contest behavior under uncertainty. However, the efficiency of a contest is sensitive to asymmetric information and the distribution a players' values because players with relatively low values can have an increased probability of success. Thus, it is important (a) to account for information asymmetries to avoid biasing predicted efficiency, and (b) to recognize that this bias is unsystematic.     

Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products

We study the optimal ( i.e. revenue maximizing) auction of multiple products. We make three major points. First, we extend the relationship between price discrimination and optimal auctions from the single-product case to the multiple-product case. A monopolist setting prices for multiple products may offer discounts on purchases of bundles of products; similarly, the optimal auction of multiple products facilitates price discrimination by allocating products inefficiently to customers who are willing to purchase both products. Second, we demonstrate that optimal auctions are qualitatively distinct from monopoly sales of multiple products. Because of uncertainty about the values of other consumers, two products are bundled probabilistically in an optimal auction for a customer who is willing to buy both of them. A customer may then receive a discount on a lower-valued product without receiving a higher-valued product. Third, we show that in an optimal auction of two products the allocation of one product may vary with the amount of competition for the other product.