Recent and Future Developments Related to “Gdp and Beyond”

Progress of societies? Well‐being of citizens? Trans‐generational impact of policies? To answer such fundamental questions and much more, the European Commission published, in August 2009, its Communication on “GDP and Beyond: Measuring Progress in a Changing World.” Through a co‐operative project, co‐chaired by Eurostat and INSEE (France), the ESS acted decisively and established an action plan to be carried out by 2020 in the context of the European Statistical Programme. This plan which also builds on Eurostat's work on Sustainable Development Indicators. For most of these actions, work has either been accomplished or is in good progress. Further challenges lie ahead, including reconciling macro‐ and micro‐data sources on household economic resources and completing the indicators set on Quality‐of‐Life. The work will also contribute to the global efforts on the Sustainable Development Goals/post‐2015 development agenda.     

The Band Pass Filter*

We develop optimal finite‐sample approximations for the band pass filter. These approximations include one‐sided filters that can be used in real time. Optimal approximations depend upon the details of the time series representation that generates the data. Fortunately, for U.S. macroeconomic data, getting the details exactly right is not crucial. A simple approach, based on the generally false assumption that the data are generated by a random walk, is nearly optimal. We use the tools discussed here to document a new fact: There has been a significant shift in the money–inflation relationship before and after 1960.     

Implementations of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization

Summary. The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of -person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash solution of the bargaining game. Next this game is modified in such a way that the unique Nash equilibrium that supports the Nash solution is even in dominant strategies. After that an -stage game in extensive form is presented whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium supports the Nash solution of the bargaining game. Finally, the support results are shown to induce implementation results in the sense of mechanism theory. Received: October 3, 1999; revised version: October 26, 1999     

Entry restrictions and the determination of quality

Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. This paper analyzes demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of this type of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and the welfare of its consumers. Selective increases in the costs of entry such as licensing requirements and direct restrictions with competitive bidding for entry rights are considered. We analyze the effects of these policies on entry decisions and also the additional selection effects that are obtained when exit is allowed for and the rights to participate in an industry can be freely traded.     

Individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling: instrumental variables quantile regression using twins data

Considerable effort has been exercised in estimating mean returns to education while carefully considering biases arising from unmeasured ability and measurement error. Recent work has investigated whether there are variations from the “mean” return to education across the population with mixed results. We use an instrumental variables estimator for quantile regression on a sample of twins to estimate an entire family of returns to education at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages while addressing simultaneity and measurement error biases. We test whether there is individual heterogeneity in returns to education and find that: more able individuals obtain more schooling perhaps due to lower marginal costs and/or higher marginal benefits of schooling and that higher ability individuals (those further to the right in the conditional distribution of wages) have higher returns to schooling consistent with a non-trivial interaction between schooling and unobserved abilities in the generation of earnings. The estimated returns are never lower than 9 percent and can be as high as 13 percent at the top of the conditional distribution of wages but they vary significantly only along the lower to middle quantiles. Our findings may have meaningful implications for the design of educational policies.     

Employment Decisions in Self-Directed Work Teams: A Regulatory Compliance Perspective

Organizations are increasingly relying on self-directed work teams (SDWTs) to accomplish organizational tasks. The introduction of SDWTs into the workplace poses a number of managerial challenges. This paper will focus on one such challenge, the continuing need to comply with labor and equal employment regulations. We discuss several factors that potentially affect the legal compliance process. These include: (1) the impact of an increasingly diverse workforce on individual behavior and team processes, and (2) the role of procedural justice perceptions in effective HR compliance management. We conclude with some practical solutions to the challenge of managing compliance in SDWT settings.