How does local partners network embeddedness affect international joint venture survival in different subnational contexts?

Do local partners' network attributes affect the survival of high-tech international joint ventures (IJV)? How does the effect of network attributes vary in different subnational institutional environments? While the classic economic explanation for IJV formation and subsequent performance draws from the resource-based view (RBV), we add the relational dimension to explain that IJV survival may be affected by local partners’ relation-specific assets within the local network. We test the effect of the local partners’ network attributes as calculated by UCINET (centrality, network status, and structural hole position) on IJV survival. We additionally assert that this relationship is moderated by subnational institutional heterogeneity. Using our sample of 125 IJV dyadic pairs of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in high-tech industries and their local partners in China, we find partial support for our claims.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

Alliances and the innovation performance of corporate and public research spin-off firms

We explore the innovation performance benefits of alliances for spin-off firms, in particular spin-offs either from other firms or from public research organizations. During the early years of the emerging combinatorial chemistry industry, the industry on which our empirical analysis focuses, spin-offs engaged in alliances with large and established partners, partners of similar type and size, and with public research organizations, often for different reasons. We seek to understand to what extent alliances of spin-offs with other firms (either large- or small- and medium-sized firms) affected their innovation performance and also how this performance may have been affected by their corporate or public research background. We find evidence that in general alliances of spin-offs with other firms, in particular alliances with large firms, increased their innovation performance. Corporate spin-offs that formed alliances with other firms outperformed public research spin-offs with such alliances. This suggests that, in terms of their innovation performance, corporate spin-offs that engaged in alliances with other firms seemed to have benefitted from their prior corporate background. Interestingly, it turns out that the negative impact of alliances on the innovation performance of public research spin-offs was largely affected by their alliances with small- and medium-sized firms.     

The structure of information release and the factor structure of returns

We model how firms releasing information on different dates causes the CAPM to fail, requiring an additional factor based on the information structure to price assets. We exemplify this mechanism’s empirical relevance using quarterly earnings announcements, which cluster across months along size and book-to-market. Seventy percent of the alpha reduction from including SMB and HML occurs in the four main earnings announcement months. The information structure factor accounts for all of SMB and HML’s seasonal alpha reduction and one third of their overall alpha reduction. Controlling for size and book-to-market, exposures to SMB and HML vary with firms’ earnings announcement month.     

A Real Options Model of Real Estate Development with Entitlement Risk

Most development projects encounter a highly uncertain entitlement process that is largely uncontrollable by developers. In this study, entitlement is modeled as a separate stage within a compound real option, where developers begin with minimal control (maximum risk) and each successful stage increases control (decreases risk). We solve the model analytically, provide three‐dimensional numerical comparisons, and empirically test the model's predictions using hand collected rezoning petitions. Our main result refines the classic development option model: developers first invest early (secure entitlements) in order to obtain the option to subsequently delay investment (construct the optimal building at the optimal time).     

Entry limiting agreements: First‐mover advantage,authorized generics,and pay‐for‐delay deals

During patent litigation, pay‐for‐delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first‐mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.     

Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a fundamental value

This study back-tests a marginal cost of production model proposed to value the digital currency Bitcoin. Results from both conventional regression and vector autoregression (VAR) models show that the marginal cost of production plays an important role in explaining Bitcoin prices, challenging recent allegations that Bitcoins are essentially worthless. Even with markets pricing Bitcoin in the thousands of dollars each, the valuation model seems robust. The data show that a price bubble that began in the Fall of 2017 resolved itself in early 2018, converging with the marginal cost model. This suggests that while bubbles may appear in the Bitcoin market, prices will tend to this bound and not collapse to zero.