The business cycle with nominal contracts

Summary In this paper we study the quantitative implications of nominal wage contracts for business cycle fluctuations. We address this issue using a model economy based on the neoclassical growth model supplemented by the assumption that cash is needed to purchase goods. We consider a variation of the standard recursive competitive equilibrium concept that is intended to capture the important features of wage contracting. We use this equilibrium construct to address three issues. First, we consider whether monetary shocks, propagated by nominal contracts, constitute a viable alternative to technology shocks as a source of aggregate fluctuations. Our results suggest that, while monetary shocks and nominal rigidities succeed in causing output volatility of the required magnitude, the resulting data have properties that are inconsistent with several key features of U.S. data. Second, we consider how the behavior of the economy varies with contract length. We find that the volatility induced by both monetary and technology shocks increases sharply with contract length. Finally we consider how much rigidity would be necessary to match the volatility of U.S. output. We find that only a very small amount of rigidity would be necessary to cause output volatility of the magnitude observed.We have received helpful comments from David Chapman, Paul Gomme, Jeremy Greenwood, Gary Hansen, Michael Keane, Tim Kehoe, Lee Ohanian, Edward Prescott, and Warren Weber. The usual disclaimer applies. This research is supported in part by NSF Grant SES-8921346 and the John M. Olin Foundation.     

Announced layoffs: Their effect on corporate financial performance

Conventional wisdom holds that when a firm gets into trouble due to lagging sales and rising costs, cutting the size of the organization to reduce fat and waste is a normal and effective response. In this study, evidence was found to suggest that just the opposite might be true. The financial performance of Fortune 100 companies was tracked over a five-year period—two years prior to the announced layoff, the year of the layoff announcement, and two years following it. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that financial performance worsened, rather than improved, following announced layoffs. Strategic and human resource implications for the management of corporate downsizing are provided.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model

This paper centers on Keynes' theory of money and his attack on the classical model. Keynes criticized the self-correcting model of the British orthodoxy along two separate lines. In the first, in which Keynes' theory of money was crucial, he took the institutional variables as given and examined the functional relationships. Keynes' burden was to undermine what he termed the "classical dichotomy," where money was a veil, playing no role in determining output and employment. Two key features of the orthodox model were loanable funds and quantity theories, and Keynes' theory of money emerged from the rejection of these theories. The key to his attack on the classical dichotomy was the speculative demand for money, which he presented as an indirect, unstable function of the interest rate. Hence, Keynes linked money demand to the interest rate. The interest rate was thus determined by monetary variables rather than real factors, contrary to British orthodox opinion. Keynes then demonstrated that intended investment and saving need not be equal at a full employment equilibrium.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. The authors are grateful to participants for their helpful suggestions. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.     

Social learning with private and common values

Summary. We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result for pure common-value environments where the state is never learned, resulting in herds or informational cascades. The medium run dynamics to convergence can be very complex and non-monotone: posterior beliefs may be concentrated on a wrong state for a long time, shifting suddenly to the correct state.Received: 6 January 2005, Revised: 5 May 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82.Jacob K. Goeree: Correspondence toFinancial support from the National Science Foundation NSF (SBR-0098400 and SES-0079301) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Richard McKelvey posthumously for insights and conjectures about information aggregation that helped shape our thinking about the problem. We also acknowledge helpful comments from Kim Border, Tilman Börgers, Bogachen Celen, Luis Corchon, Matthew Jackson and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Arizona, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the California Institute of Technology, the 2003 annual meeting of ESA in Pittsburgh, the 2003 Malaga Workshop on Social Choice and Welfare Economics, the 2003 SAET meetings in Rhodos, and the 2003 ESSET meetings in Gerzensee.     

The factory system in the British industrial revolution: A complementarity thesis

This paper offers an explanation for the rise of the factory system in Britain during the Industrial Revolution (1770-1850) based on the concept of complementarity: Investment in machinery, process supervision, and improved quality control formed a cluster of complementary activities in which adopting any one increased the marginal return to also adopting the others. Further, factory owners introduced process supervision not only to increase work effort, but also to balance worker incentives among production, quality control, and asset maintenance tasks. To test this hypothesis, I have constructed a new data set from firm studies and archival records. Measures of firms’ adoption of the activities are positively correlated in the cross-section of firms, providing evidence in favor of the complementarity hypothesis.     

A brief technology assessment of the Carbon Dioxide effect

Significant increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide are occuring as a result of fossil fuel combustion. More than a four-fold increase over preindustrial levels may occur by the year 2100. Heating of the atmosphere, changes in precipitation patterns and global storm paths, and other resulting effects are sure to cause significant social changes. This article is essentially a methodological case study demonstrating a useful but inexpensive type of technology assessment. It summarizes current research findings on “the CO₂ effect,” and presents hitherto unpublished findings that resulted from a brief but systems-oriented approach. These findings suggest that most published forecasts of phenomena associated with a CO₂ buildup may be systematically low because various positive feedback relationships are not reflected.