Industrial incentives,domestic resource costs and resource allocation in Madagascar

This paper uses 104 episodes from the Hufbauer et al. (1985, 1990) dataset to examine the correlates of classes of outcomes of economic sanctions. The parsimonious equations presented identify the characteristics of sanctions episodes conducive to success rather than marginal success, and the characteristics productive of failure rather than marginal failure. Failure is most likely if there is significant third party assistance to the target, and if the pre-existing trade linkage between sender and target is small. Success is most easily achieved when the objective is not classified as 'modest', and when pre-sanction relations between sender and target are cordial or neutral. The equations presented overcome data and methodological flaws of earlier studies, exhibit reasonable predictive accuracy, and satisfy a battery of tests of statistical significance, hypothesized coefficient sign, goodness of fit, high likelihood and informational efficiency.     

Is property crime caused by drug use or by drug enforcement policy?

The relationships among drug offenses, prorperty crime, and the allocation of police resources are investigated in a structural model using data from Florida countries. Law enforcement resources are scarce, and as efforts to combat drug crime increase the amount of these resources allocated to property crime is reduced. This reallocation of police resources results in reduced deterrence for property crime and, as a result, an increase in these crimes. The evidence presented suggests that rising property crimes in Florida are at least partially the result of drug enforcement policy.     

Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant‐Bank Model

This study utilizes a dominant‐bank model to investigate whether an increase in retail loan and deposit‐market concentration increases the incentives for both dominant and fringe banks to monitor their loans and thereby improve the quality of their loan portfolios. It shows that the effects on banks' incentives to engage in monitoring aimed at eliminating loan default losses in response to increased concentration of retail market shares of loans and deposits depend critically on whether the banks' asset and liability choices are interdependent. When the asset and liability decisions of both dominant and fringe banks are independent, a shift in market shares in favor of the dominant bank generates a straightforward increase in the incentives of all banks to monitor their loans. Under portfolio interdependence, the effects on monitoring outcomes at dominant banks and at banks within the competitive fringe depend on more complicated configurations of parameters. This fact helps explain mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between bank competition and measures of bank risk and soundness.