The local economic impact of construction projects in a small and relatively self-contained economy: The case of Lancaster University

Whilst the local multiplier impacts of the annual operation of universities has been the subject of intensive research, the economic impacts of capital construction projects have been almost completely ignored. This paper presents the results of detailed analysis of capital projects at Lancaster University in 1993-The reasons for the radically different annual operation and construction multipliers estimated in the Lancaster study are examined. Despite the smaller size of construction multipliers it is argued that it is a serious mistake to estimate local construction multipliers by making simplifying assumptions on the size of the key parameters in the multiplier equations.     

Endogenous timing in trade policy games: Should governments use countervailing duties?

Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously.     

An Empirical Test of Cognitive Style and Strategic Decision Outcomes*

abstract We examine how cognitive style, as measured by the MBTI, affects strategic decision outcomes. Executives participated in a simulated strategic decision making environment that allowed controlled collection of decision outcomes, including manager decisiveness, decision quality, and perceived effectiveness. We found that iNtuiting/Thinking managers used their intuition to make cognitive leaps based on objective information to craft more decisions of higher quality than other managers. In contrast, Sensing/Feeling types used time to seek socially acceptable decisions, which led to the lowest number of decisions and the lowest perceived effectiveness of all. We found no effect on decisiveness or perceived effectiveness based on a manager's preference for Perceiving or Judging. However, we found that others perceived Extraverted managers as being more effective than Introverted managers when, in fact, the Extraverts were no more decisive than Introverts. Thus, cognitive style influences actual decision outcomes as well as how others perceive one's decision performance.     

Burn or bury? A social cost comparison of final waste disposal methods

This paper evaluates the two well-known final waste disposal methods, incineration and landfilling. In particular we compare the social cost of two best-available technologies using a point estimate based on private and environmental cost data for the Netherlands. Not only does our comparison allow for Waste-to-Energy incineration plants but for landfills as well. The data provide support for the widespread policy preference for incineration over landfilling only if the analysis is restricted to environmental costs alone and includes savings of both energy and material recovery. Gross private costs, however, are so much higher for incineration, that landfilling is the social cost minimizing option at the margin even in a densely populated country such as the Netherlands. Furthermore, we show that our result generalizes to other European countries and probably to the USA. Implications for waste policy are discussed as well. Proper treatment of and energy recovery from landfills seem to be the most important targets for waste policy. Finally, WTE plants are a very expensive way to save on climate change emissions.     

BOOK REVIEW

Emerging Financial Markets, by David O. Beim and Charles W. Calomiris. McGraw‐Hill/Irwin, 2001, 364 pages, price $75.00.     

Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games

Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a “best possible” outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the players—games in which optimization by individuals approximately optimizes the social good, in spite of the lack of coordination between players. Our results extend previous work on traffic routing games.