Limited participation and consumption-saving puzzles: A simple explanation and the role of insurance

In this paper, we show that the existence of a large, negative wealth shock and insufficient insurance against such a shock could explain both the limited stock market participation puzzle and the low-consumption–high-savings puzzle. We then conduct an empirical analysis on the relation between household portfolio choices and access to private insurance and various types of government safety nets. The empirical results demonstrate that a lack of insurance against large, negative wealth shocks is positively correlated with lower participation rates and higher saving rates. Overall, the evidence suggests an important role of insurance in household investment and savings decisions.     

Leverage regulation: An agent-based simulation

An agent-based financial market model is used to simulate the effects of financial regulation to reduce financial leverage. Results suggest that regulating leverage using margin calls can lead to less frequent financial crises per century, however, it creates harder hit financial crises than without regulation. In addition, regulation where the central authority tries to prick bubbles also leads to less frequent financial crises, but, creates greater volatility. Lastly, I find that leverage regulation where agent’s ability to borrow is not dependent on price produces less frequent crises and less volatility than the other regimes.     

A Cooperative Game Theory of Noncontiguous Allies

This paper develops a cooperative game-theoretic representation of alliances with noncontiguous members that is based on cost savings from reducing overlapping responsibilities and sequestering borders. For various scenarios, three solutions (the Shapley value, nucleolus, and core's centroid) are found and compared. Even though their underlying ethical norm varies, the solutions are often identical for cases involving contiguous allies and for rectangular arrays of noncontiguous allies. When transaction costs and/or alternative spatial configurations are investigated, they may then differ. In all cases the cooperative approach leads to a distribution of alliance costs that need not necessarily coincide with the traditional emphasis on gross domestic product size as a proxy for deterrence value (the exploitation hypothesis). Instead, burdens can now be defined based upon a country's spatial and strategic location within the alliance.     

Ability and specialization among economic researchers

It is not obvious whether a firm's more talented workers should be more specialized, and in fact, the relationship between ability and specialization seems to differ across industries. In this paper, I examine the case of knowledge production in economic research, and find that abler economists tend to publish more general research. This result suggests substitutability between general and specialized skill in research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Funding the story of hybrid ventures: Crowdfunder lending preferences and linguistic hybridity

Prosocial crowdfunding platforms are venues for individual lenders to allocate resources to ventures that specifically pursue economic and social value. In a setting where hybridity is expected, do crowdfunders respond positively to category-spanning ventures, or do they prefer to fund ventures that are more clearly situated within a single category? Drawing on theory rooted in category membership and spanning, our hypotheses test whether prosocial crowdfunding lenders will more quickly allocate resources to hybrid microenterprises that communicate their hybridity, or to those that communicate a single one of their dual aims. Our study demonstrates that even in such a setting, crowdfunders lend more quickly to microenterprises that position themselves within a single linguistic category in which the social is emphasized over the economic. This suggests that how hybrid organizations position themselves in their linguistic narratives has a significant impact on resource allocation by external prosocial audiences.     

Entrepreneurial processes in social contexts: how are they different, if at all?

Scholars have compared and contrasted commercial and social entrepreneurship along a variety of dimensions, suggesting that entrepreneurial antecedents and outcomes differ within a social context. However, little is known about whether entrepreneurial processes differ within social contexts. In this paper, we ask to what extent the antecedents and outcomes that make social entrepreneurship unique influence entrepreneurial processes. Using an inputs–throughputs–outputs framework, we assess the relationship between four antecedents (social mission/motivation, opportunity identification, access to resources/funding, and multiple stakeholders) and three outcomes (social value creation, sustainable solutions, and satisfying multiple stakeholders) to the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness, and autonomy) (Lumpkin and Dess, Acad Manag Rev 21(1):135–172, 1996). Our analysis suggests that many entrepreneurial processes remain essentially the same or are affected only slightly. However, autonomy, competitive aggressiveness, and risk-taking are influenced to some extent by the presence of multiple stakeholders and access to resources/funding. Entrepreneurial processes may also differ when applied to efforts to satisfy multiple stakeholders and achieve sustainable solutions. We subsequently discuss the implications of our analysis for future social entrepreneurship research and practice.     

Why banks should keep secrets

Summary. We show that it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Our model, based upon Diamond-Dybvig (1983), has the feature that banks acquire information about their risky assets before depositors acquire it. A bank has the option of using contracts where the middle-period return on deposits is contingent on this information, but by doing so it must also reveal the information. We derive the conditions on depositors preferences and banking technology for which a bank would prefer to keep information secret even though it must then use a non-contingent deposit contract.Received: 5 November 2002, Revised: 19 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, G21, G28.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Ed Green, Chandra Kanodia, Andy McLennan, Arijit Mukherji, Bradley Ruffle, Neil Wallace, Warren Weber, and especially Nobu Kiyotaki for useful comments and suggestions.     

Communication of preferences in contests for contracts

This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are unable to change their style, then there is no effect on the welfare of the sellers. If the sellers are able to make adjustments, extra information may either boost or damage the sellers?? profits. While the chance that there will be a proposal of a style preferred by the buyer cannot decrease, the buyer??s surplus may increase or decrease.     

TAIL FORECASTING WITH MULTIVARIATE BAYESIAN ADDITIVE REGRESSION TREES

We develop multivariate time-series models using Bayesian additive regression trees that posit nonlinearities among macroeconomic variables, their lags, and possibly their lagged errors. The error variances can be stable, feature stochastic volatility, or follow a nonparametric specification. We evaluate density and tail forecast performance for a set of U.S. macroeconomic and financial indicators. Our results suggest that the proposed models improve forecast accuracy both overall and in the tails. Another finding is that when allowing for nonlinearities in the conditional mean, heteroskedasticity becomes less important. A scenario analysis reveals nonlinear relations between predictive distributions and financial conditions.     

Perceived and actual option values of college enrollment

An important feature of postsecondary schooling is the experimentation that accompanies sequential decision making. Specifically, by entering college, a student gains the option to decide at a future time whether it is optimal to remain in college or to drop out, after resolving uncertainty that existed at entrance about factors that affect the return to college. This paper uses data from the Berea Panel Study to quantify the value of this option. The unique nature of the data allows us to make a distinction between “actual” option values and “perceived” option values and to examine the accuracy of students' perceptions.