Are All Private Benefits of Control Ineffective? Principal–Principal Benefits,External Governance Quality,and Firm Performance

Private benefits of control (PBC) are benefits that controlling shareholders consume, but that are not shared with minority shareholders. Research focusing on the value protection role of corporate governance typically frames PBC as principal–principal (PP) agency costs, and interprets them as a form of minority shareholder expropriation that decreases firm performance. Taking a value creation perspective of corporate governance, however, we propose a more nuanced role for PBC. Specifically, we see them also as PP agency benefits that compensate controlling shareholders for their monitoring and advisory services, which can increase firm performance. Since both PP costs and benefits affect firm performance, we theorize that PBC enhance firm performance at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, we show that the effect of PBC on firm performance is more positive when country‐level external governance mechanisms are strong.     

Canal Interocéanique de Panama. Commission d'études instituéc par le Liquidateur de la Compagnie Universelle. Rapports I-IX.-I. Rapport général

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Blackjack in Holland Casino's: basic, optimal and winning strategies

This paper considers the card game Blackjack according to the rules of Holland Casino's in the Netherlands. Expected gains of strategies are derived with simulation and also with analytic tools. New efficiency concepts based on the gains of the basic and the optimal strategy are introduced. A general method for approximating expected gains for strategies based on card counting systems is developed. In particular it is shown how Thorp's Ten Count system and the High-Low system should be used in order to get positive expected gains. This implies that in Holland Casino's it is possible to beat the dealer in practice.     

Pressure and Politics in Financial Accounting Regulation: The Case of the Financial Conglomerates in the Netherlands

This article examines the political process of promulgating two controversial laws which pertain to the reporting of Dutch financial conglomerates. Central to the study is the exploration of the lobbying efforts observed during the process, and the interaction between the government, the supervisors of banks and insurance companies, the industry and its associations, and the users and auditors of annual reports of financial conglomerates. Previous studies in accounting-rule development have often ignored influences that do not fall within the formal regulatory procedures. By adopting an inductive research approach, this study explores in some detail the behaviour of participants, including their use of informal lobbying methods. Pluralist theory is used to explain the nature of the political process and the behaviour of interested parties. The findings indicate that the Dutch political process in accounting matters is indeed pluralistic. Although auditors and producers of accounts seem to have greater possibilities to participate, the users of corporate reports are able to voice their opinion effectively. Overall, the users' preferences were acknowledged in the final rules governing the reporting by financial conglomerates.     

Food security and structural adjustment: Empirical evidence on the food price dilemma in Southern Africa

This article considers effects of price on food security and the food equation in the developing areas of South Africa. Firstly, the food (or hunger) equation is examined in more detail. Secondly, thefood price dilemma is analysed using empirical data obtained elsewhere in sub‐Saharan Africa. Thirdly, the situation in the developing areas of South Africa is examined. Empirical evidence in sub‐Saharan and Southern Africa accentuates the skewness and concentration in the market participation profile of rural households with respect to especially staples. Supply response to higher prices in these areas is also limited. These findings place the food price dilemma on centre stage in Southern Africa.