Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Open Leagues, Closed Leagues and Competitive Balance *#We thank the Editor and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

This paper compares conventional static measures of competitive balance with measures that take account of the mobility of teams into the upper ranks of professional leagues, which we call dynamic competitive balance. We use this measure to compare the open soccer leagues that permit entry by the process of promotion and relegation, to the closed leagues of North America where there is no automatic right of entry. We also identify the theoretical distribution of entrants to the top k ranks assuming that all teams have equal probabilities of winning. We find that the open leagues (OL) we study are less balanced, dynamically, than closed leagues (CL), and also that OL lie much further away from the theoretical distribution than CL.     

Design Inertia: Designing for Life‐Cycle Flexibility in Internet‐Based Services*

Managing innovation in rapidly moving environments, such as Internet‐based services, is a major challenge in theory and in practice. Most of the existing literature focuses on the development process as the main area in which innovation takes place. However, in environments where the pace of change of technology and market needs is extremely high, managing service innovations means not only being able to design a good service but also, more importantly, continuously redesigning and adapting the service in order to deal with frequent exogenous changes and opportunities. A high number of innovations therefore must be introduced throughout the entire life cycle of a service. This capability of introducing incremental and radical innovations during the service life cycle (i.e., to adapt a service to contextual changes and opportunities after it has been first released onto the market) at low costs and in the shortest possible time is what is defined here as service life‐cycle flexibility. This process of service adaptation and upgrading implies significant challenges that can be traced back to when a service is first conceived and designed. In fact, many decisions made during the first design process (i.e., the choice of a given database environment) involve a low reversibility rate and may reduce the possibility of taking advantage of future unpredictable opportunities, creating what is called inertia toward innovation. In other words, service life‐cycle flexibility largely depends on how a service has been first designed. This article analyzes two in‐depth case studies of Italian online newspapers and identifies five possible inertia factors that may influence service life‐cycle flexibility, namely (1) technological inertia; (2) internal organizational inertia; (3) external organizational inertia; (4) customer inertia toward changes in the service package; and (5) customer inertia toward changes in the service interaction design. These inertia factors are traced back to the service development process in order to suggest design practices that may increase the service life‐cycle flexibility.     

Cost structure,productivity and efficiency of the Italian public higher education industry 2001–2011

In this paper, I analyze the cost structure of the Italian higher education system for the decade between 2001 and 2011, by means of a stochastic translog cost function. I suggest that the judgment about the optimal configuration of the sector is strongly dependent upon the policy priorities set by decision makers. When assuming that the universities’ output is the number of students, scale economies are exhausted, and marginal costs are relatively low; when considering graduates as outputs instead, there is opportunity for increasing the scale of operations. Inefficiency affects production in a sensible manner, especially when assuming that the target output is the number of graduates. Moreover, efficiency contributes to explaining a relevant portion of the productivity increases in the period. No significant scope economies between teaching and research emerge, suggesting that a higher degree of universities’ specialization can be a direction for improving the sector’s efficiency and productivity.     

How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment

How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.     

Moonlighting politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.     

SEASONALITY,FORECAST EXTENSIONS AND BUSINESS CYCLE UNCERTAINTY

Abstract Seasonality is one of the most important features of economic time series. The possibility to abstract from seasonality for the assessment of economic conditions is a widely debated issue. In this paper we propose a strategy for assessing the role of seasonal adjustment (SA) on business cycle measurement. In particular, we provide a method for quantifying the contribution to the unreliability of the estimated cycles extracted by popular filters, such as Baxter and King and Hodrick–Prescott (HP). The main conclusion is that the contribution is larger around the turning points of the series and at the extremes of the sample period; moreover, it much more sizeable for highpass filters, like the HP filter, which retain to a great extent the high‐frequency fluctuations in a time series, the latter being the ones that are more affected by SA. If a bandpass component is considered, the effect has reduced size. Finally, we discuss the role of forecast extensions and the prediction of the cycle. For the time series of industrial production considered in the illustration, it is not possible to provide a reliable estimate of the cycle at the end of the sample.     

Indirect versus Direct Constraints in Markets with Vertical Integration

For an assessment of market power on the wholesale (or merchant) market in the presence of vertically integrated firms, we analyze the interaction of direct constraints, arising from competition on the wholesale market, and of indirect constraints, arising from substitution on the retail market. A vertically integrated firm that still participates in the merchant market exerts both direct and indirect constraints. We analyze the factors that determine the importance of indirect constraints. We find that, in contrast to a common presumption, indirect constraints are sometimes more powerful than direct constraints. We furthermore analyze the incentives of integrated firms to still participate in the merchant market, provided that this is technologically feasible.     

The effects of unification: markets,policy, and cyclical convergence in Italy, 1861–1913

This paper uses time-series evidence on construction movements to examine the convergence of regional business cycles in the decades that followed Italy’s unification. The aggregate series point to cyclical convergence, but a sector-level analysis traces this result to the decline in differentiated “regional-policy” shocks. The regional market cycles diverged, as regions specialized in different sectors of production; market-cycle convergence is observed only within the “industrial triangle,” the regions of which also developed different specializations. This suggests that the balance between growing interdependence and growing differentiation is not general, as the current literature presumes, but specialization-specific.     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.     

Competition in Communication Networks: Pricing and Regulation

By any measure, the communication sector is important. It isno surprise, then, that the communication sector has attractedthe attention of both policy-makers and economists. In thispaper, we argue that four characteristics of the networks thatdeliver communication services make this area of particularinterest. We analyse the implications of networks' cost structures;the strong complementarity between their components; the demand-sideexternalities that arise from consumption of their services;and the social obligations attached to them. Despite the attentionthat the communication sector has received, many aspects ofcompetition between networks are still poorly understood. Weidentify some of the key issues that will continue to troubleregulators and interest academics.