Agency Theory and Japanese Corporate Governance

Agency theory has been used to predict managerial strategic behavior in the past. However, critics have commented that this theory, in its applications, has been too Anglo-American specific. Research in non-Anglo-American settings has been scarce. Recent changes in the Japan Commercial Code and moves by Japanese corporations to access global equity markets allow us to test the veracity of this criticism by examining how Japanese firms respond strategically to the increased requirement for disclosure and transparency; whether they behave in ways congruent with agency theory predictions. Agency theory states that managers who are held accountable for their use of corporate resources will deploy them in ways to enhance stockholder value rather than increase their shares of the economic residual. Thus, we would expect to observe a difference in Japanese managerial behavior accompanying an increased exposure to global capital markets. Using data from Japanese firms, we found some support for the usefulness of agency theory to non-Anglo-American settings when the rules of capital market discipline are allowed to operate.     

Disaggregating the group effect: Vertical and horizontal <Emphasis Type="Italic">keiretsu</Emphasis> in changing economic times

This paper examines the evolution of keiretsu group affiliation among members of horizontal and vertical keiretsu in Japan over two time periods: 1992–1997, and 1997–2002. We found that ties were more stable in the later time period and therefore restricted our empirical analysis to the 1992–1997 period. We also found differences in the response of vertically and horizontally linked groups to economic downturn and capital market change—vertically linked groups weakened their ties while horizontally linked groups showed more stability.     

When Elites Forget Their Duties: The Double‐Edged Sword of Prestigious Directors on Boards

Previous research indicates that the performance effect of prestigious directors is ambiguous. Our study addresses this issue by integrating the theoretical lens of board capital and the institutional perspective. We argue that prestigious directors can bring benefits as well as costs. We claim that the emergence of these costs depends on the institutional context, specifically the institutional characteristics of the country's corporate elite circle which is characterized by the elite cohesion and the elite exclusiveness. Our empirical results with a 15‐country sample covering the period of 2005 to 2014 provide evidence for the overall existence of a positive performance effect of prestigious boards. However, our results also indicate that these beneficial effects of prestigious boards are mitigated in countries with high elite exclusiveness. Hence, under these certain institutional conditions, the elite‐favouring behaviour of prestigious directors also brings costs.     

Congestible communications networks and international trade

We build a two-country model of monopolistic competition with communications networks. A communications network is characterized by (1) the existence of large fixed costs of network provision, and (2) the presence of congestion. It is demonstrated that both the size of a country and the relative magnitude of the congestion effect determine its comparative advantage: if the congestion effect (resp., the cost-sharing effect) prevails universally, a comparative advantage in the goods that require communications is held by the smaller (resp., larger) of the two countries. JEL Classification: D43, F12
Réseaux de communication, congestion et commerce international. Ce mémoire présente un modèle de concurrence monopolistique à deux pays avec des réseaux de communication. Un réseau de communication est caractérisé par (1) l'existence de coûts fixes importants pour la mise en place du réseau et (2) la présence de congestion. On montre que la taille du pays et la magnitude relative de la congestion déterminent l'avantage comparatif : si l'effet de congestion (ou respectivement l'effet de partage des coûts) prévaut, un avantage comparatif dans les biens qui demandent plus de communication est détenu par le plus grand (respectivement le plus petit) des deux pays.     

A Prepayment Model for the Japanese Mortgage Loan Market: Prepayment-Type-Specific Parametric Model Approach

This paper proposes a framework for construction of a prepayment model suitedto the Japanese mortgage loan market and assesses the validity of thisframework based on an empirical analysis using data from Japan. In thisframework, a model is constructed for each of three prepayment types, namely,`full prepayment', `partial prepayment', and `subrogation', using a parametricproportional hazards model, which was also employed by Schwartz and Torous(1989). Combining these three types of models allows one to take into accountthe effects of partial prepayments, which are frequently used in the Japanesemortgage market, and to simultaneously construct a model for both prepaymentand default. Time-dependent (path-dependent) covariates are introduced intothe model, which are estimated by the maximum likelihood method based on thefull likelihood that takes into account the time-dependence of the covariates.Results of the empirical analysis indicate that the hazard functions differsubstantially depending on the prepayment type. In addition, results indicatethat the fit of the model can be improved by the distinction of prepaymenttypes and the introduction of the market interest rates as path-dependentcovariates.