HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

This article investigates the relationship between the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare in multiple‐leader Stackelberg models. We formulate two long‐run models of free entry of followers; in the first (second) model, leaders select their output before (after) the entry of the followers. We find that in both models, in contrast to the short‐run models, the Stackelberg model yields a larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model does regardless of the number of leaders; that is, beneficial concentration always occurs.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan

This paper investigates the politicoeconomic properties of the fiscal reconstruction process in Japan by analyzing the dynamic game among local interest groups with concessions of region-specific privileges. Free-riding behavior of local interest groups brings numerous deficits. Our empirical evidence indicates that local privileges were powerful in the 1990s, which is the main reason fiscal reconstruction did not perform very well in the 1990s. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2002, 16(4), pp. 492–511. Faculty of Economics, Keio University, and Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego; and Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan, and Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan, 3-1-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8970, Japan. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, F13, D62.     

Economic Integration of Countries with International Public Goods

This paper develops a model of economic integration that is subject to random emergency costs. To mitigate the effects of these disruptions, each country that belongs to a club provides an international public good. This paper incorporates voluntary provision of public goods into a rigorous general equilibrium model of economic integration under uncertainty. It is shown that an increase in the probability of war or the penalty ratio in a club may raise the welfare and the size of the club if risk aversion with respect to private consumption is not so large. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1994, 8(4), pp. 530–550. Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Tokyo 113, Japan; and Department of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560, Japan.     

Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms

We revisit the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and market competition indexes such as the Hirschman–Herfindahl index. It is affected by the number of the firms and asymmetry among the sizes of the firms; the smaller the number of firms and the more asymmetry among firms, the higher the market concentration index. The literature on mixed oligopolies suggested that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the number of private firms, and thus, decreases with the market competition index, assuming that all private firms are homogeneous. We investigate how asymmetry among private firms affects the optimal degree of privatization. We propose the simplest and natural model formulation to discuss asymmetry among private firms. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is either nonmonotone or monotonically increasing, and thus never monotonically decreasing, in asymmetry among private firms.     

Japan's Fiscal Policies in the 1990s

This paper first summarises Japan's fiscal policies in the 1990s. Then, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the sustainability problem. We find that the Keynesian fiscal policy in the 1990s was not effective and fiscal sustainability may therefore become a serious issue. We also estimate the optimal level of deficits and evaluate fiscal reconstruction movements. It is shown that the actual deficit exceeded the optimal level in the late 1990s. We then inspect fiscal reconstruction movements in the Hashimoto Administration in 1997 and find that the major factor of recession in 1997 was not fiscal consolidation. An important lesson from Japan's fiscal policies in the 1990s is that long‐run structural reform is more important than short‐run Keynesian policy.     

Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note

We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.      

Implicit protectionism via state enterprises and technology transfer from foreign enterprises

We formulate a mixed triopoly in which one state enterprise competes with one domestic and one foreign private enterprise. The private enterprise can transfer its technology to the private rival, which reduces the rival’s production cost. We show that if the privatization policy is endogenous, then the foreign firm voluntarily transfers its technology. We also show that the foreign enterprise may strategically raise its local ownership share. These results suggest that the existence of a state enterprise and its potential future privatization serve as an industrial policy that improves the domestic firm’s competitive advantage relative to the foreign enterprise.     

An Asymptotic Expansion for Forward–Backward SDEs: A Malliavin Calculus Approach

This paper proposes a new analytical approximation scheme for the representation of the forward–backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of Ma and Zhang (Ann Appl Probab, 2002). In particular, we obtain an error estimate for the scheme applying Malliavin calculus method for the forward SDEs combined with the Picard iteration scheme for the BSDEs. We also show numerical examples for pricing option with counterparty risk under local and stochastic volatility models, where the credit value adjustment is taken into account.     

Japanese fiscal reform: fiscal reconstruction and fiscal policy

This paper evaluates the recent movement of Japanese fiscal reform. We first summarize fiscal policy in 1990s. Then, we investigate several relevant topics of fiscal policy such as the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the sustainability problem. We then consider dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among various interest groups. This paper points out that the long-run structural reform is more important than the short-run Keynesian policy in Japan.     

Intra‐industry Trade,Reconsidered: The Role of Technology Transfer and Foreign Direct Investment

This paper investigates novel determinants of intra‐industry trade (IIT) of late 1990s Japanese trade. Our empirical analysis shows that IIT is increased not only by the similarity of GDP and factor endowment but also by technology transfer via Japanese FDI. In particular, the current high proportion of Japanese IIT with Asian countries can be explained by technology transfer (licensing between headquarters and overseas affiliates) via FDI.