An Economic Analysis of Public Transfers

This paper develops simple models of public transfers. The sources of income inequality are differences in ability and in luck. The government employs a redistribution policy that arises from altruistic motives in the case of ability differences. I consider the case where the government re-optimizes income transfers after it observes the outcome of private activities. When the source of income inequality is differences in luck, the economy creates a mutual insurance or provides public goods out of risk-sharing motives. I derive the paradoxical result that a more able individual would not enjoy higher welfare than a less able individual. I also investigate how public transfers react to increases in income level and income inequality.
JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F35.     

Silk, regional rivalry, and the impact of the port openings in nineteenth century Japan

The centre of economic activities in Japan was once in western Japan. Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, economic activities within Japan have been continuously shifting towards the east side of the country including Tokyo. Conventional wisdom associates the end of the Tokugawa feudal regime with this eastward shift. By applying a new economic geography model to the silk economy of Japan in the nineteenth century, this paper explains why the majority of industrial activities located initially in western Japan, and offers an alternative economic explanation for the eastward shift as an impact of the port openings in 1859.     

Should Firms Employ Personalized Pricing?

This paper theoretically considers a duopoly model in which all firms do not always employ personalized pricing. Our model incorporates the fact that firms engage in marginal cost‐reducing activities after they decide whether to employ personalized pricing. When the ex ante cost difference between the firms is large, the less‐efficient firm does not employ personalized pricing even when the fixed cost to do so is zero. This is because employing personalized pricing induces the rival firm to engage more in reducing its costs, which is more likely to harm the less‐efficient firm.     

Welfare properties of strategic R&D investments in Hotelling models

In linear-city models, if firms are allowed (not allowed) to locate outside the linear city, they engage in excessive (insufficient) R&D investments from the normative viewpoint. This implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments.     

Mixed duopoly,privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.     

A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction

This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analyzing the infinite duration differential game among interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden. By comparing the first-best solution of fiscal reconstruction, the open-loop Nash equilibrium path, and the feedback Nash equilibrium path, we highlight the free-riding behavior of interest groups in the process of fiscal reconstruction. We derive explicitly the target levels of government debt and primary expenditures, and the adjustment speed of fiscal reconstruction under the respective solutions. We also examine the impacts of consumption taxes on their adjustment speeds as well as long-run outcomes of the respective paths.     

Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit

This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.     

International environmental outsourcing

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of firms shifting stages of their production processes overseas. In this paper we investigate whether firms outsource the dirtier stages of production to minimise domestic environmental regulation costs—a process broadly consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis. We develop a theoretical model of international environmental outsourcing that focuses on the roles played by firm size and productivity, transport costs and environmental regulations. We test the model’s predictions using a firm-level dataset for Japan and do find evidence of an ‘environmental outsourcing’ effect.     

ENDOGENOUS FLEXIBILITY IN THE FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM

We investigate the flexible manufacturing system (FMS) by using the spatial price discrimination framework of Pal. The degree of flexibility when producing variants can be increased by increasing the investment or production cost and is endogenously determined. Our result is that private incentives for increasing flexibility are excessive from a social welfare perspective.