Globalization and business cycle transmission

The paper uses long-run GDP data for developed countries drawn from Maddison [Maddison, A. (2003). The world economy—Historical statistics. Paris: OECD Development Centre] to generate deviation cycles for the period from 1870 to 2001. The cyclical deviates are examined for their bilateral cross-correlation values in three separate periods, those of the first globalization wave (1870–1914), the period of the “bloc economy” (1915–1959) and for the period of the second globalization (1960–2001). Cluster analysis is applied and the McNemar test is used to test for the relative coherence of alternative groupings of countries in the three periods. The bloc economy period emerges as one that features some well-defined sub-global clusters, where the second globalization period does not, the first globalization period lying between the two in this respect. The second globalization period shows a generally higher level of cross-correlations and a lower variance than the other two periods. The features uncovered suggest that the second globalization period is indeed one that comprises a more inclusive world economy than ever before.     

Endogenous timing in the switching of technology with Marshallian externalities

We analyze endogenous timing in the switching of technology. Each user chooses when to purchase a new product which embodies new technologies characterized by Marshallian externalities. The technological switch occurs when a large number of users purchase new products. Under complete information, multiple market equilibria exist, and one of the equilibria in which technological switching occurs is efficient. However, if we introduce even a small amount of uncertainty, the switch is delayed in the unique equilibrium under perfect competition, resulting in a loss of social welfare. The market power of a monopolistic supplier of new products alleviates this inefficiency.     

On the level of optimal capital import in a decentralized competitive economy

In a competitive economy, capital import will affect the distribution of income among domestic economic units. Our main aim is to determine the optimal level of capital import, given that the distribution of income among people is accounted for. In order to consider explicitly the effect of capital import on saving behavior, we shall adopt a simple, two-period life cycle growth model. It will be shown that in order to know if the government can increase everybody's long-run utility, the criterion of the golden rule is important.     

Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry

We investigate whether or not privatization is beneficial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic competition model. We discuss the relationship between the welfare effects of privatization and the degree of foreign direct investment in the private sector, which is an important problem in developing countries and in transition economies such as China and Central and Eastern European countries. We find that, in the long run, privatization of a public firm is more likely to improve welfare when the country depends on foreign capital in the private sector, whereas the opposite tendency exists in the short run.     

Pricing Discrete Barrier Options Under Stochastic Volatility

This paper proposes a new approximation method for pricing barrier options with discrete monitoring under stochastic volatility environment. In particular, the integration-by-parts formula and the duality formula in Malliavin calculus are effectively applied in pricing barrier options with discrete monitoring. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one that shows an analytical approximation for pricing discrete barrier options with stochastic volatility models. Furthermore, it provides numerical examples for pricing double barrier call options with discrete monitoring under Heston and λ-SABR models.     

Qualitative and quantitative studies of leadership in multinational settings: Meta-analytic and cross-cultural reviews

Much of the research on leadership has been conducted by Western researchers and has led to a largely Western and individualistic perspective on leadership. This has led researchers to raise questions concerning the extent to which these theories apply globally. In particular, do Western theories of leadership apply to the same extent in more communal Asian countries, such as Japan, China, Indonesia, and Thailand? Based on leadership studies conducted in Japan, we argue that Japanese leadership practices often differ from the styles practiced widely in the West. These differences in behavior have their roots in Japanese cultural traditions and business practices. Our conclusion is based on the results of meta-analyses of studies of the five most popular leadership theories used in the West, an empirical study of transformational and gatekeeper leadership, and in-depth qualitative case studies of three Japanese corporate leaders. We observe that there are relatively few qualitative studies of leaderships in international contexts, and propose that in order to understand leadership phenomena in a global context, it is necessary to take a triangulation approach, employing surveys, experimental manipulations, company records, and qualitative interviews.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).     

Market Instability in a Stackelberg Duopoly

m -period duopoly model with inventory costs, where each firm chooses when to produce. We find that, in contrast to most existing works concerning endogenous roles of the firms, no pure strategy equilibrium exists when m is strictly larger than two. This result indicates that no stable pattern of allocation of roles exists except for a two-period model; thus the leader-follower relationship inevitably becomes instable. Received August 1, 2000; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior and long-run equilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to derive some interesting results on long-run equilibrium by considering entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior explicitly. Our framework is a two class, two production sector model in order to analyze the dynamic stability properties in the cases of Kaldor's saving assumption and Pasinetti's saving assumption. We shall introduce a further adjustment mechanism: the speeding up (slowing down) of capital accumulation in that sector in which the rate of profit is higher (lower).     

Sufficient conditions for the optimal degree of progression to decrease with the government revenue requirement

This paper derives some sufficient conditions under which an increase in the tax revenue requirement leads to a less progressive tax structure in the context of the educational investment model.