Partial privatization in mixed duopoly

We investigate a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors. The private firm maximizes profits, while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration. We consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm. We find that neither full privatization (the government does not hold any shares) nor full nationalization (the government holds all of the shares) is optimal under moderate conditions.     

Japan's fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan. We first summarize Japan's fiscal policy in recent years and discuss advantages and disadvantages of government deficits. Next, we investigate the macroeconomic effects of Japanese fiscal policy and evaluate the plausibility of non-Keynesian effects. We also analyze the possibility of the crowding-in effect of fiscal policy and investigate the spillover effects of deregulation. Finally, we discuss political constraints in the fiscal reconstruction attempts and propose some measures for successful fiscal reforms in the near future.     

Trade liberalisation and agglomeration with firm heterogeneity: Forward and backward linkages

This paper studies the impact of trade cost reductions on the geographical concentration of manufacturing in the presence of intermediate input linkages, firm heterogeneity and fixed export costs. The presence of non-exporting firms in this Melitz-like model hampers full agglomeration by weakening the forward and backward linkages and fortifying market-crowding effect. Gradual trade liberalisation causes gradual agglomeration rather than the catastrophic agglomeration that economic geography models have long suggested. Also, trade liberalisation produces divergent welfare effects with the periphery losing and the core gaining; even costless trade fails to equalise welfare in the core and periphery due to non-exported intermediate inputs.     

The Effects of Technology Changes on Sectoral Trade Patterns*

We develop a model in which sectoral trade patterns depend on both the technology common to all sectors and the technologies specific to each sector. Changes in the common technology level affect sectoral trade patterns through their impact on intertemporal optimization behavior, while changes in the sector‐specific technology levels affect sectoral trade patterns by influencing comparative advantage. The model shows: (1) unexpected increases in the common technology level worsen sectoral trade balances, but expected increases in the common technology level improve them; and (2) given other countries’ sectoral technology levels, an increase in a sector‐specific technology level relative to other sectors improves sectoral trade balances through its operation on comparative advantage. Using Japanese data, the empirical results reported in this paper support the model’s predictions.     

On the development strategy of countries of intermediate size—An analysis of heterogeneous firms in a multi-region framework

This paper compares two policies: trade cost reduction and firm relocation cost reduction using a three-country version of a heterogeneous-firms geography and trade model, where the three countries have different market (population) sizes. We show how the effects of the two policies differ, in particular for the country of intermediate size. Unless the intermediate country is very small, in a relative sense, it will gain industry when relocation costs are reduced, but lose industry when trade costs are reduced. The smallest country loses industry in both cases, but only experiences lower welfare in the case of lower relocation costs. Thus, the ranking of the policies from the point of view of the two small and intermediate countries tends to be the opposite.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Optimal privatization and uniform subsidy policies: A note

The privatization neutrality theorem states that the share of public ownership in a firm does not affect welfare under an optimal uniform tax‐subsidy policy. We revisit this neutrality result. First, we investigate the case in which the private firm is domestic. We show that this neutrality result does not hold unless public and private firms have the same cost function. Next, we investigate a case in which both domestic and foreign investors own the private firm. We show that the optimal degree of privatization is never zero, and thus, the neutrality result does not hold, even when there is no cost difference between public and private firms.     

Welfare criteria for tax reforms : An extension

Pazner and Sadka (1981) offer simple sufficient conditions for accepting or rejecting tax reforms based on the theory of index numbers. We provide not only sufficient conditions but also necessary conditions for the validity of tax reforms. Thus, a complete characterization of tax reforms is obtained.     

The golden rule and the Ramsey rule at a second best solution

This paper shows that even at the second best solution the golden rule and the Ramsey rule hold if all the effective non-lump sum taxes are available in the context of an overlapping generations model.