Attitudes about EU expansion and zero‐sum thinking

EU expansion can be seen as a positive‐sum process benefiting all countries by creating larger markets that stimulate more productive economies through increased specialization and economies of scale, implying that the general public in all countries should favour expansion. Contrarily, expansion can be perceived as zero‐sum. Capital and production relocate from higher to lower wage regions while labour does the opposite, possibly raising unemployment and reducing wages in the higher wage regions. The general public in these countries may come to oppose EU expansion attributing any deterioration in their work situation to the gains of new citizens of the European Union. Analysis of changes in Irish attitudes towards EU expansion in 2002, 2007 and 2009 finds no evidence of a link from lowered economic conditions to increased opposition to EU expansion. The only evidence for zero‐sum thinking is that diminished economic circumstances are associated with increased opposition to immigration, but this is not associated with increased opposition to further EU expansion.     

Merger policy in innovative industries

We analyze optimal merger policy in R&D-intensive industries with product innovation aiming to improve the quality of products. Our results suggest that a permissive merger policy is rarely optimal in high-tech industries when the antitrust authority considers a welfare standard that balances the impact of mergers on consumers’ surplus and firms’ profits. In particular, relative to a benchmark where the effects from R&D are absent, we show that the optimal merger policy should not be substantially more permissive in the presence of those effects from R&D.     

Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution

This paper considers the assignment of tradable permits—representing property rights of an environmental good—to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms. These community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences. For a special case with a sole household, market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level. However, for a group of households, the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods. We design a revenue-sharing mechanism akin to unitization, under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation. Importantly, in some cases, efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good.     

BidPacket: trading bandwidth in public spaces

Smart devices such as smartphones and tablets are used extensively in public spaces for the transmission and reception of content in the form of text, photos and streaming videos. Since the bandwidth provided for wireless access is limited in public areas, it becomes an issue for users to gain access to the bandwidth they need at the right times. While an omniscient controller could assign bandwidth to each device on the basis of their needs and overall availability, imperfect information about the instantaneous state of the wifi access patterns and needs of users make for a very inefficient allocation of such bandwidth. This paper provides a solution for bandwidth allocation by creating a market among users of smart devices so that they can bid for extra bandwidth when they need it and sell it when they don’t. They do so by using a virtual currency that is conserved so that each device owner maximizes his own utility. This utility function is composed of both the benefit accrued from accessing bandwidth and the loss of the currency incurred in bidding for such bandwidth. Extensive simulations show that this market-based method outperforms an omniscient model when demand is uncertain, while minimizing bandwidth consumption.     

Building from Scratch: New Cities,Privatized Urbanism and the Spatial Restructuring of Johannesburg after Apartheid

By the start of the twenty‐first century, the once dominant historical downtown core of Johannesburg had lost its privileged status as the center of business and commercial activities, the metropolitan landscape having been restructured into an assemblage of sprawling, rival edge cities. Real estate developers have recently unveiled ambitious plans to build two completely new cities from scratch: Waterfall City and Lanseria Airport City (formerly called Cradle City) are master‐planned, holistically designed ‘satellite cities’ built on vacant land. While incorporating features found in earlier city‐building efforts, these two new self‐contained, privately‐managed cities operate outside the administrative reach of public authority and thus exemplify the global trend toward privatized urbanism. Waterfall City, located on land that has been owned by the same extended family for nearly 100 years, is spearheaded by a single corporate entity. Lanseria Airport City/Cradle City is a planned ‘aerotropolis’ surrounding the existing Lanseria airport at the northwest corner of the Johannesburg metropole. These two new private cities differ from earlier large‐scale urban projects because everything from basic infrastructure (including utilities, sewerage, and the installation and maintenance of roadways), landscaping, security services, the regulation of common spaces, and selling and branding the city are firmly in the hands of private profit‐making corporate entities and outside the mandate of public authorities.     

Firm Investment decisions in the post‐conflict context

Economic and political transition can occur through peaceful or violent means. Violent transition disrupts the incentive for firms to make productive investments. This paper studies the determinants of profit reinvestment for firms in post‐conflict transition economies. Results indicate that while access to finance is an important determinant of reinvestment during transition, it is not as important in the post‐conflict context. However, property rights protections, in particular institutions of contract enforcement, are a more important determinant of profit reinvestment for firms operating in the post‐conflict environment than for firms in general. This indicates that obstacles to investment are context specific.     

Two-stage DEA: <Emphasis Type="Italic">caveat emptor</Emphasis>

This paper examines the wide-spread practice where data envelopment analysis (DEA) efficiency estimates are regressed on some environmental variables in a second-stage analysis. In the literature, only two statistical models have been proposed in which second-stage regressions are well-defined and meaningful. In the model considered by Simar and Wilson (J Prod Anal 13:49–78, 2007), truncated regression provides consistent estimation in the second stage, where as in the model proposed by Banker and Natarajan (Oper Res 56: 48–58, 2008a), ordinary least squares (OLS) provides consistent estimation. This paper examines, compares, and contrasts the very different assumptions underlying these two models, and makes clear that second-stage OLS estimation is consistent only under very peculiar and unusual assumptions on the data-generating process that limit its applicability. In addition, we show that in either case, bootstrap methods provide the only feasible means for inference in the second stage. We also comment on ad hoc specifications of second-stage regression equations that ignore the part of the data-generating process that yields data used to obtain the initial DEA estimates.