Marx, Marxism and the cooperative movement

This paper has a dual aim: first, to draw attention to a numberof passages in which Marx explicitly extolled the cooperativemovement and thereby confute the wrong but widely held assumptionthat Marx was inimical to the market and rejected cooperationas a production mode even for the transition period; second,to argue that the continuing neglect of Marxists both of thecooperative movement and of the passages from Marx (and Engels)that present a system of producer cooperatives as a new productionmode can be traced back in part to the late emergence of aneconomic theory of producer cooperatives.     

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.     

Global Restructuring and Liberalization: Côte d ’Ivoire and the End of the International Cocoa Market?

The restructuring of the world cocoa market has concluded with the liberalization of the sector in the world's leading producing country, Côte d'Ivoire, clearing the way for domination by an oligopoly of global companies. This paper describes how Côte d'Ivoire's share of world production created an illusion but not the reality of market power. In the 1990s, in the wake of failed attempts to influence the world market, the Ivorian cocoa sector experienced a series of upheavals that were both pivotal to broader changes in the global market and a refiection of them. The converging strategies of new Ivorianfirms and of the major global grinding companies resulted in increased vertical integration in Côte d'Ivoire, exemplified in the development of 'origin grinding '. Later, financial difficulties encountered by Ivorian firms led to global companies taking control. Amongst the results of these changes are a decline in the role of traders, a redefinition of the relationship between grinders and chocolate manufacturers, and a standardization of cocoa quality around an average 'bulk' level. This signals the end of 'the producing countries' and of the global market.     

AIDS,Economic Growth and the Epidemic Trap in Africa

Most studies find that AIDS has a relatively weak impact on economic growth because they assume that it affects only one flow variable and only in the short term (the flow of labour available and capable of working at a time t in the economy). But AIDS also has a long-term impact on stock variables that existing models do not take into account, specifically, on both human and physical capital. Integrating these two impacts in a growth model with multiple accumulation factors reverses the findings of standard impact evaluations. A fairly wide range of epidemic effects modifies the economy's long-term growth regime, creating what we might call an epidemic or regressive “trap”. Government action should be designed in view of this risk and should intervene preferentially in favour of human capital, through health and educational spending. Finally, this model changes the cost-efficiency calculations about expanding antiretroviral therapies to a large part of the working population and indicates that such treatment is substantially more cost-efficient than initially thought.     

E Pluribus Unum? Legitimacy Issues and Multi-stakeholder Codes of Conduct

Regulatory schema has shifted from government to governance-based systems. One particular form that has emerged at the international level is the multi-stakeholder voluntary code of conduct (MSVC). We argue that such codes are not only simply mechanisms by which various stakeholders attempt to govern the action of the corporation but also systems by which each stakeholder attempts to gain or retain some legitimacy goal. Each stakeholder is motivated by strategic legitimacy goal to join the code, and once a member, is also required to assist in maintaining the institutional legitimacy of the code, resulting in “networked legitimacy.” We begin our analysis of these systems by first exploring the growth and structure of such MSVCs, and then building an analytical framework using strategic and institutional legitimacy as they apply to such MSVCs. We contribute to the codes of conduct literature by developing the construct of networked legitimacy from strategic and institutional legitimacy. We then apply our framework to the United Nations Global Compact, one of the predominant MSVCs today. In doing so, we: (1) demonstrate how different stakeholders are pursuing different types of legitimacy through their participation in the code, (2) examine the specific opportunities and risks in terms of what we have called “networked legitimacy” posed by the institutional design of actual MSVCs, and (3) create an argument for three pillars supporting the legitimacy of MSVCs.