Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited

This paper aims to shed light on the role of the ‘ideology’of political parties in shaping the evolution of the welfarestate in 18 developed democracies, by providing empirical findingson the determinants of social-programme entitlements and socialspending over the period 1981–99. The paper shows thatstructural change is a major determinant of the extent of socialprotection. Our results suggest that overall spending is drivenup by structural change. On the other hand, strong structuralchange has a negative influence on welfare entitlements measuredby the net rate of sickness insurance. Partisan influence playsan important role in the dynamics of the welfare state. Left-winggovernments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregatesocial expenditure, while right-wing governments undertake evenstronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a reaction to structuralchange. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: bruno.amable{at}ens.fr; donatella.gatti{at}cepremap.cnrs.fr;jan.schumacher{at}wiwi.uni-regensburg.de     

Active labour market policies and job tenure

In this paper, we study the effect of subsidised on-the-jobtraining, training for the unemployed and pure wage subsidieson job tenure. Correcting for selection biases, we find thateach of the labour market policies increases the length of jobtenure. Despite the sensitivity of the estimates to the parametricassumptions with respect to the unobservables, the effect ofsubsidised on-the-job training schemes is always found to besignificantly positive. Training programs for the unemployedand pure wage subsidies always have a positive, but statisticallynon-significant effect Our results provide some support forhuman capital theories as opposed to matching theories.     

Signaling,network externalities,and subsidies

A signal may be more effective the greater the number of people who use the same signal, thereby creating a network externality and potentially generating multiple equilibria. A subsidy to the signal can increase efficiency, and the signalers may benefit from the subsidy even if they pay taxes to finance it. But people who benefit from the signal may oppose too large a subsidy, because a large subsidy could destroy the signaling value.     

Multi-country event-study methods

We provide the first simulation evidence of event-study test performance in multi-country non-US samples. The nonparametric rank and generalized sign tests are more powerful than two common parametric tests, especially in multi-day windows. The two nonparametric tests are mostly well specified, but neither is perfectly specified in all situations. The parametric standardized cross-sectional test can provide a useful robustness check but is less powerful than the nonparametric tests and rejects too often in single-market samples and when firm-specific events affect the market index. Local-currency market-model abnormal returns using national market indexes are sufficient.     

Options and efficiency in spaces of bounded claims

In a seminal contribution, Ross (1976) showed that a static finite state-space market can be completed by supplementing the primitive securities with ordinary call and put options. Galvani (2009) extends this result to norm separable _Lp$L_p$-spaces, with 1≤p<∞$1\le p<\infty$. This study concludes that options maintain the same spanning power in the space of bounded payoffs topologized by the duality with the space of the state price densities. In particular, under mild assumptions on the probability space, options written on a claim that is a.s. equal to an injective function complete the market.