OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS BEHAVIOR AND THE INEQUALITY OF EARNINGS BY SEX AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES*

This paper examines differences in earnings by occupations, and within occupations by sex and by race, on the basis of the 1/100 Public Use Samples of the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Population Censuses. It employs interval analysis to establish 32 categories of occupations with similar characteristics. Little relation was found between mean earnings of occupational groups and the degree of earnings inequality within them. When the figures are examined by sex, it was found that men, on average, earned over twice as much as women in both years, but women's earnings were more unequally distributed (as measured by the Gini coefficient). Women are concentrated in the traditional “female” occupations, which tend to be those at the bottom of the earnings scale, and men have a monopoly of the higher paid occupations. But mean earnings for men exceeded those for women in all occupational groups except one, even in the primarily female occupations. Standardizing first for occupational distribution and then for earnings by occupation, it was found that earnings differences between males and females within occupation had a greater impact on the overall male-female earnings ratio than did differences in occupational distribution by sex. In contrast, when the figures are examined by race, the change in occupational distribution (primarily the movement of blacks out of farming and of blacks and Spanish speakers out of personal services) was the major factor. There was also a considerable degree of earnings inequality within demographic groups. The degree of inequality was in the main reduced when the demographic groups were subdivided into occupations, but it was still substantial. Additional factors like time worked, schooling, and experience must be taken into consideration in understanding this phenomenon.     

Una nuova caratterizzatione dell'ammissibilità nella teoria delle decisioni

In questo lavoro viene fornita una nuova caratterizzazione dell'ammissibilità attraverso un adeguato uso della nozione di ammissibilità parziale. Questa caratterizzazione consente di affrontare le questioni riguardanti la completezza della classe delle decisioni ammissibiliti sotto condizioni «maneggevoli». Fornisce inoltre un approccio unificante al problema della completezza che consente di derivare, come casi particolari, alcuni risultati già noti nella letteratura sull'argomento.

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In this paper a new characterization of admissibility is given for general decision problems. It is based on an adequate use of the notion of partial admissibility.A general decision problem is usually synthetized by a triplet (, , ) where is the states (or parameters) space, the set of available decisions and is a family of real valued functions defined on and expressing numerically the consequences of choosing when the state is . The set is regarded as a subset of the space of all real valued functions on endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence.As for as admissibility is concerned all the pertinent information about decisions are contained in the corresponding functionsW .This allows to introduce a notion of partial admissibility through the neigh-bourhoods of this topology. Admissibile decisions are then shown to be limits of monotone non increasing sequences of partially admissible decisions.Moreover this topological characterization allows to prove the completeness of classes of admissible decisions under acceptable systems of conditions which contain as special cases, known results in literature.

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Lavoro svolto nell'ambito del Gruppo Nazionale per l'Analisi Funzionale e le sue Applicazioni del C.N.R.     

Nonresponse Bias and Stimulus Effects in the Dutch National Election Study

Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

Temporary Liaisons: The Commitment of ‘Temps’ Towards Their Agencies*

abstract The majority of research on organizational commitment has focused on commitment in traditional, ongoing and open‐ended relationships. The commitment of employees in non‐standard work arrangements such as temporary employment has been subject to much less theoretical and empirical investigation. In this study, we examine the affective and continuance commitment of temporary workers towards their agency and its determinants. We distinguish two groups of determinants: the process by which the temporary worker chose a particular agency and the support provided by the agency. The findings can be summarized as follows: (1) affective commitment among temps is generally higher than their continuance commitment; (2) having more alternative agencies to choose from (i.e., volition) does not enhance the commitment of temporary workers; (3) a public choice for a particular agency raises both types of commitment, whereas the perceived agency dependence created by the choice increases continuance, but not affective commitment; and (4) both types of commitment are positively influenced by agency supportiveness, reflected in the way the agency deals with problems, the career support it provides, and the way it keeps in close contact with its temporary workers. Finally, the results suggest that factors raising affective commitment may ‘spill over’ to increase continuance commitment.