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41.
    
In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - How can entrepreneurs be effective when making decisions? To enrich current research on entrepreneurship and cognition, the present study...  相似文献   
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In Italy, employees are fully insured against earning losses due to illness. Since worker's health is not easily verifiable, absenteeism due to illness is considered an empirical proxy for employee shirking. The Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW) provides individual data on days of absence. Controlling for personal characteristics and potential determinants of health status and family responsibilities (age, gender, education, marital status, children at home), we show that the nature of employment contracts affects workers' incentives to provide effort: sickness absences, at least partially, hide opportunistic behaviours. The type of occupation and the labour contracts affects workers' behaviour in that more protected and difficult to monitor jobs show significantly higher levels of absenteeism: employees in public sector or in large firms, with permanent contracts or with longer tenure, individuals living in regions with low unemployment rates. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
45.
The paper discusses the relevant institutional and economic aspects of the postal service, and analyses both the arguments for abolishing the statutory monopoly and those for retaining it. The main thesis of the paper is that public and private postal services differ from each other in many aspects: transaction costs, the willingness of the customer to pay, market structure, and possibilities of substituting the service with other communication instruments. Therefore, a simple privatisation will not solve per se the efficiency problems of the service. furthermore, the European Commission, which published in 1992 a green paper on postal services, is considering the possibility of harmonising the quality of the service within the EU and gradually reducing the gap in national postal prices. This seems to be an effective device to force firms towards the greater efficiency required in a Continental market. In future, the competition will take place not so much between private firms (more interested in running the high-value segments), as between national public carriers, as shown by the phenomenon of remail.  相似文献   
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Labour contracts which establish performance–related pay are afflicted with the firm's moral hazard problem because of the difficulty in the verifiability of performance by an external authority. Some models have explored the possibility that such contracts could be enforced through a mechanism of the firm's reputation or thanks to an excess of demand in the labour markets (unfilled job vacancies). In this paper a simple model is proposed to show the working of an alternative mechanism for performance–related pay contracts based on turnover costs, borne by firms arising from the process of hiring, training and firing. By sinking a certain amount of resources as turnover costs, employers may credibly promise to pay a bonus, if faced with the worker's threat to quit in the case of cheating, to avoid the loss of specific capital. This provides a formalization of the insight that turnover costs and specific investments might support the enforcement of implicit contracts. The welfare implications of this mechanism are worked out, showing how turnover costs on the one hand reduce the available social surplus but on the other hand increase this surplus by providing incentives for optimal effort.  相似文献   
47.
We propose a very efficient numerical method to solve a nonlinear partial differential problem that is encountered in the pricing of American options. In particular, by using the front-fixing approach originally developed in Wu and Kwok (J Financ Eng 6:83–97, 1997) and Nielsen et al. (J Comput Finance 5:69–97, 2002) in conjunction with a suitable change of the time variable, a (nonlinear) partial differential problem is obtained which can be solved very efficiently by means of a finite difference scheme enhanced by repeated Richardson extrapolation. Numerical results are presented showing that the novel algorithm yields excellent results, and performs significantly better than a finite different method with Bermudan approximation.  相似文献   
48.
    
A benefit corporation (BC) is the legal status of an enterprise that embraces a dual-purpose business model (BM) of maximising shareholder value while satisfying stakeholders' interests. The literature so far has focussed on the motivations beyond the birth or transformation of BC, the factors that can favour the emergence of BCs, and the results companies achieve after the transformation, as well as studies on the new BCs' legislation. Other studies have examined how the duality of purpose (profit vs. social benefits) can be composed, and the risks of a mission drift favouring profit maximisation in BCs. By drawing on stakeholder theory, this study aims to highlight the role of stakeholders in the process of transformation from a traditional for-profit BM to a BC model. We adopt a qualitative approach through a longitudinal case study to observe the transition of a small-medium enterprise into a BC. The results show how management and engagement practices coexist in the relationships with stakeholders and how an instrumental approach prevails.  相似文献   
49.
The application of Engel’s Curve in a single-product perspective may dramatically change the role of quality in affecting the dynamics of economic performance. This paper introduces a specification of preferences that regards quality as luxury, and quantity as necessary. The analysis is carried out by using a framework similar to Grossman’s and Helpman ’s (1991), while quality is defined as in Stokey (1988). The resulting consumer’s demand crucially depends on quality. Quality is potentially able to prevent the process, implied by neoclassical models, that leads the value of consumption goods to decline over time. By doing so, quality also affects the consumption bundle shares and the variety-specific consumption growth rates, thus influencing all dynamic quantitative variables of the economy. I thank Professor Beniamino Moro for his guidance and encouragement. I thank Stephen Wright for his comments and suggestions. I have benefited from the support of Alessio Moro, Dario Unali, Debora Fletcher, Emilio Merella, Esteban Jaimovich, Francesca Lamanna, Matteo Bellinzas, Mauro Merella and all my friends. I am also indebted to Professor Cuong Le Van and Professor Stephen Parente for their advice. I thank two anonymous Referees for their useful remarks.  相似文献   
50.
We consider a finite economy in which the data are depending on an exogenous parameter and the utilities satisfy a condition, previously introduced by the authors and called sequential pseudocontinuity, weaker than sequential lower semicontinuity and than sequential upper semicontinuity. We show that the economy has a nice asymptotical behavior, that is: for any sequence (x n ) n of exogenous parameters converging to x o , any convergent subsequence of a sequence of approximate competitive equilibria of converges to an exact equilibrium of .   相似文献   
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