Is it worth subsidising regional repertory theatre?

Subsidies to the performing arts are usually justified by referenceto externality and public goods arguments that are hard to quantify.We suggest that subsidies to theatres may be appropriate becauseof their inability to engage in spatial price discriminationto capture consumer surplus. For one major theatre, we use audiencedata and the Clawson-Knetsch travel cost method to assess theextent of consumer surplus and find that it exceeds the levelof subsidy received from public sources. On the basis of thisexample, current subsidy levels are justifiable even withoutrecourse to traditional externality/public goods arguments.     

The Impact of a Goods and Services Tax on Product Market Competition

This paper explores the effects of a goods and services tax on the degree of competition in an oligopolistic industry and identifies a new mechanism through which the tax influences product market competition. The analysis focuses upon the effects of the tax in a concentrated industry and it is demonstrated that there exist circumstances under which the tax may promote competition by rendering tacit collusion more difficult.     

Sources of family income and expenditure on children's private,after‐school education in Korea

This paper examines the relationship between sources of family income and household expenditure on private, after‐school education for children in secondary schools in Korea in the context of educational ‘credentialism’, which values evidence of college education highly. Data from a survey of 514 parents of secondary school students are used. Estimated ordinary least squares coefficients indicate that the wife's income, but not the husband's, was positively associated with the amount of spending on children's education at private, after‐school programmes. This finding suggests that some married women with children in Korea seek employment in order to earn the money needed for their children's private, after‐school education.     

Internationale Paul-Felix-Lazarsfeld-Professur an der Human- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Wien eingerichtet

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The geography of output volatility

This paper examines the structural determinants of output volatility in developing countries, and especially the roles of geography and institutions. We investigate the volatility effects of market access, climate variability, the geographic predisposition to trade, and various measures of institutional quality. We find an especially important role for market access: remote countries are more likely to have undiversified exports and to experience greater volatility in output growth. Our results are based on Bayesian methods that allow us to address formally the problem of model uncertainty and to examine robustness across a wide range of specifications.     

On Models of Default Risk

We first discuss some mathematical tools used to compute the intensity of a single jump process, in its canonical filtration. In the second part, we try to clarify the meaning of default and the links between the default time, the asset's filtration, and the intensity of the default time. We finally discuss some examples.     

Spatial Interaction,Spatial Multipliers and Hospital Competition

The hospital competition literature shows that estimates of the effect of local market structure (concentration) on pricing (competition) are sensitive to geographic market definition. Our spatial lag model approach effects smoothing of the explanatory variables across the discrete market boundaries, resulting in robust estimates of the impact of market structure on hospital pricing, which can be used to estimate the full effect of changes in prices inclusive of spillovers that cascade through the neighboring hospital markets. The full amount, generated by the spatial multiplier effect, is a robust estimate of the impacts of market factors on hospital competition. We contrast ordinary least squares and spatial lag estimates to demonstrate the importance of robust estimation in analysis of hospital market competition. In markets where concentration is relatively high before a proposed merger, we demonstrate that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can lead to the wrong policy conclusion while the more conservative lag estimates do not.     

Hunting the Whale: More Evidence on State Government Leviathans

Caplan holds that governments are Leviathans, seeking to extend their power by increasing government expenditures beyond the level preferred by voters. We extend Caplan's model by examining the real (percentage) growth rates of government. We also examine whether government size increases at an increasing rate as the minority party weakens. We find evidence that supports and fails to support the original Leviathan hypothesis. We also fail to support our extensions of Caplan's hypothesis. Furthermore, our significant and contrary results have intuitively appealing interpretations. From these results, we conclude that the impact of political party power on government spending is ambiguous.