Social media,political uncertainty,and stock markets

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study proposes a new measure of firm-level uncertainty exposure around important political events. More specifically, we construct a degree of...     

Input Rigidities and Performance of Vietnamese Universities

Universities in Vietnam are inclined to have an inefficient mix of input resources because of rigidities restricting the adoption of advanced teaching technology. There has been a deferral of the adoption of new teaching technologies to meet the rest of the world's higher education standards. Using an input‐orientated data envelopment analysis (DEA) method, technical, scale and mix efficiency indicators are estimated for 112 Vietnamese universities over the period 2011–2013 using the Färe–Primont index. The results indicate that the technical, scale and mix efficiency indicators are 0.784, 0.866 and 0.829, respectively. Using the fractional regression model, it is found that location, age, ownership and financial capacity have significant influences on the mix efficiency indicators of universities.     

Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999-2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.     

Allocating multiple units

Summary. This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points. Received: December 23, 1999; revised version: December 10, 2001     

The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure numerical examples of multiple admissible minima

We present two numerical examples of multiple admissible minima obtained by using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative technique: a forgotten and somewhat farfetched example, constructed by Hildreth and Lu, and a new example, based on more typical economic data.     

Testing for structural change in the dynamic adjustment model with autoregressive errors

The dynamic CUSUM test for structural change proposed by Kr?mer, Ploberger and Alt (1988) is investigated when the errors are serially correlated in a linear dynamic model. We show that the dynamic CUSUM test can be modified to allow for serial correlation in the disturbance using the same procedure as in Kao and Ross (1995), and that the modified dynamic CUSUM test retains its asymptotic significance levels. Monte Carlo results suggest that the empirical size of the dynamic CUSUM test is highly distorted while the empirical size of the modified dynamic CUSUM test is fairly robust to the change on the degree of autocorrelation. We also find that the power of the modified test essentially depends on the angle between the mean regressors and the structural shift. First version received: April 1997/Final version received: January 1998     

Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcomep _c and the bilateral bargaining outcomep _b are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost larger thanp _c −p _c to the seller of changing partner,p _c is the unique outcome, otherwise no restriction expires. In the second variation the seller makes anε-binding preannouncement of whether he will change buyer after disagreement. Ifε is small there are equilibrium prices close top _c . But for anyε, if the discount factor is close to 1, the unique equilibrium price isp _c . The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Predicting technical effciency in stochastic production frontier models in the presence of misspecification: a Monte-Carlo analysis

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the sensitivity of technical efficiency measures to the choice of functional specification in stochastic production frontier models. It is shown that inappropriate functional specifications translate into a misspecification in the conditional mean of the stochastic frontier regression model. This misspecification, in turn, results in estimates of technical efficiency, confidence intervals and production elasticities being biased, even asymptotically. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that the severity of the bias depends on the functional specification and the percentage contribution of the variance of technical inefficiency to the total variance of the composed errors.