Optimal Regulation Under Uncertainty

This paper is concerned with the problem of price regulation when demand is uncertain. Uncertainty gives rise to substantial difficulties in determining both the return a firm's owners should be provided and a set of prices capable of producing that return. We argue that conventional approaches to price regulation are incapable of attaining the economically desirable objectives of efficiency and an equitable return to investors. The deficiencies in current practices are attributable to the separation of the risk measurement-return determination and price setting activities in the conventional approach. We present a model of the regulated firm that synthesizes contemporary financial market theory and the theory of the firm under uncertainty. ¹ 1 A recent paper by Baron 1 furnishes an excellent review of a host of diverse issues involving the behavior of the firm under uncertainty and the role of financial markets.
In our approach, the income stream produced by the firm is valued ex ante in the financial market according to investors' perceptions and preferences over riskreturn characteristics. We portray the firm as producing risk and return by choosing among available production technologies to maximize its market value, given the prices set by regulators. Within this framework, it is shown that regulators can choose the lowest prices consistent with an equitable return to investors. We also show that prices so chosen induce the choice of the optimal technology by the firm.     

Profiling Consumers Who Register Complaints Against Auto Repair Services

Surveys of consumer problems and reactions to those problems indicate considerable failure on the part of consumers to seek redress when faced with unsatisfactory purchases. The present study extends this research by using a longitudinal field survey of automobile repair services to investigate some consumer and purchase-related variables hypothesized to influence consumer actions following unsatisfactory purchase experiences. The results are consistent with conclusions emerging in other consumer satisfaction research that complaining behavior is influenced by both comparisons of purchase expectations with outcomes and individual consumer characteristics and dispositions.     

Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World

We analyze cross‐sectional and time‐series information from 46 equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. We find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We find strong evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display significantly less negative skewness.     

ZERO INFLATION: TRANSITION COSTS AND SHOE LEATHER BENEFITS

The idea that the monetary authority cannot achieve price stability except at the cost of a recession is the most common and convincing argument against price stability. This paper presents calculations showing that the resource costs of a recession that might result from eliminating a 4 percent inflation are approximately equal to the "shoe leather" costs incurred when inflation is stable at 4 percent.     

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ANTITRUST POLICY

Some scholars would legalize all purely vertical resale price maintenance (RPM). They acknowledge that RPM can harm consumers when it facilitates horizontal collusion among manufacturers or dealers. But when RPM is purely vertical (i.e., when it is imposed by a manufacturer acting independently), they argue that it must be procompetitive. Recent theoretical research has shown, however, that purely vertical RPM can reduce economic efficiency. This result occurs when the higher prices and dealer services induced by RPM benefit marginal consumers but substantially reduce the welfare of intramarginal consumers, who would have preferred the product without the services at a lower price. Since these circumstances are empirically plausible, a rule of per se legality may not be appropriate. At the same time, evaluating RPM under the rule of reason might not be workable. Anticompetitive instances of the type described could be difficult to prove. These research findings, therefore, are most consistent with a rule of per se illegality for RPM, with exceptions for situations in which RPM is most likely to be pro-competitive (e.g., new entry).