Ben Bernanke and Bagehot's Rules

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has claimed that the Fed's bank bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis were consistent with Walter Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort. This paper demonstrates Bernanke's claims to be mistaken. First, we outline Bagehot's doctrine for a classical lender of last resort. Next, we discuss Bernanke's theory of bank bailouts and his statements regarding the Fed's role in the 2008 bank bailouts. Finally, we examine the bailouts and demonstrate that, contrary to Bernanke's claims, the Fed's actions were not consistent with Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort.     

Determinants of the Demand for Home Equity Credit Lines

From the Survey of Consumer Finances conducted in 1989 and 1992 a logit model was tested for demographic and financial influences on household decisions to utilize home equity line credit. Results indicate that among households with credit lines other than credit card lines or business lines, the choice of a home equity credit line in lieu of another type of check credit line is influenced principally by percentage of equity in the home, income, net worth, age of the borrower, and credit price. Several implications may be derived from this study. As the markets reflect more complete information about the low-risk attributes of this credit, the convenience as a payment mechanism, and the tax subsidy to homeowners, it is expected that home equity credit lines users will be distributed more evenly across income and wealth categories.     

Who Pays for Credit Cards?

The authors model side payments in a competitive credit‐card market. If competitive retailers absorb the cost of accepting credit cards by charging a higher goods price to everyone, then someone must subsidize convenience users of credit cards to prevent them from defecting to merchants who do not accept cards. The side payment could be financed by card users who roll over balances and pay interest. It is rational for them to do so if their subjective discount rates are high enough. Charging different prices to different customers based on the underlying cost of the payment instrument would be more efficient for retailers. However, banks may offer incentives to attract convenience users because some of them may become interest‐paying users (“revolvers”) in the future.     

Age Differences in Response to Grocery Store Price Information

The study reported here investigated age differences in consumer response to grocery store price information. A sample of 160 female consumers shopped for twelve grocery products in a simulated store. Following the shopping task, subjects responded to an unannounced memory performance test requiring them to recall the prices of products on the shelves. Respondents' methods of encoding information and certainty regarding recall were also recorded. Analysis revealed age differences in usage of price information, in recall of product prices, and in certainty experienced by shoppers. Hypothesized age differences in the encoding of information did not surface. Discussion centers on the policy implications of these findings.     

Consumer Welfare Implications of Changes in Interstate Telephone Pricing

Past practice in regulating telephone prices has encouraged telephone companies to incur excessive costs. The Federal Communications Commission has recently changed some of these practices. In this paper the consumer welfare implications of some of these changes are examined, primarily the institution of interstate subscriber line charges and changes in the procedures for allocating costs among jurisdictions. The conclusion is that these changes serve consumer interests.     

The Role of Public and Private Complaining in Satisfaction with Problem Resolution

The results of a two-phase panel study were used to investigate the relationships among satisfaction with complaint resolution, reports of public and private complaining, and hypothesized antecedents of complaint behavior. Path analysis of a theoretical model of complaint behavior suggested that the degree of public complaining was positively related to satisfaction with the eventual outcome of the problem while the extent of private complaining had a significant negative relationship. Analysis of the antecedents showed that only monetary cost associated with the problem was positively related to both public and private complaints, underscoring the difficulty of predicting complaining from personal characteristics.