Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World

We analyze cross‐sectional and time‐series information from 46 equity markets around the world to consider whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. We find some evidence that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where short sales are allowed and practiced. A common conjecture by regulators is that short sales restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We find strong evidence that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display significantly less negative skewness.     

Venture-Capital Investment in Minority Business

This study analyzes the performance of mature investments made by venture-capital (VC) funds that specialize in financing minority business enterprises. We explore the hypothesis that VCs focusing on investing in minority businesses earn attractive returns because this market niche is underserved. Minority VC funds collectively earned yields on their realized investments that were estimated to be broadly equivalent to those of the mainstream VC industry. However, these yields vary greatly from fund to fund. VC fund traits that predict high yields on individual investments are identified by estimating multivariate regressions explaining net investment returns.     

Is Fraud Contagious? Coworker Influence on Misconduct by Financial Advisors

Using a novel data set of U.S. financial advisors that includes individuals' employment histories and misconduct records, we show that coworkers influence an individual's propensity to commit financial misconduct. We identify coworkers' effect on misconduct using changes in coworkers caused by mergers of financial advisory firms. The tests include merger‐firm fixed effects to exploit the variation in changes to coworkers across branches of the same firm. The probability of an advisor committing misconduct increases if his new coworkers, encountered in the merger, have a history of misconduct. This effect is stronger between demographically similar coworkers.     

The Carry-Forward Provision and Management of Bank Reserves

The 1968 amendment to Regulation D of the Federal Reserve Code permits banks to carry forward one sequential reserve excess or deficiency into the next reserve accounting period. This was intended to reduce the weekly pressure on individual banks to adjust their reserve position. We find, instead, that the carry-forward provision gives individual banks an incentive to alternate weekly between reserve excesses and reserve deficiencies. Thus, the carry-forward provision tends to induce reserve position adjustments even in the absence of changes in the level of deposits. In addition, the carry-forward provision reduces the impact of interest-rate changes on the desired level of excess reserves.     

Profiling Consumers Who Register Complaints Against Auto Repair Services

Surveys of consumer problems and reactions to those problems indicate considerable failure on the part of consumers to seek redress when faced with unsatisfactory purchases. The present study extends this research by using a longitudinal field survey of automobile repair services to investigate some consumer and purchase-related variables hypothesized to influence consumer actions following unsatisfactory purchase experiences. The results are consistent with conclusions emerging in other consumer satisfaction research that complaining behavior is influenced by both comparisons of purchase expectations with outcomes and individual consumer characteristics and dispositions.     

The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may yield benefits through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity. We use unaudited pre–SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect firm risk and cost of equity. After controlling for other risk factors, we find that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity. Our change analyses document that auditor-confirmed changes in internal control effectiveness (including remediation of previously disclosed internal control deficiencies) are followed by significant changes in the cost of equity that range from 50 to 150 basis points. Overall, our cross-sectional and intertemporal change test results are consistent with internal control reports affecting investors' risk assessments and firms' cost of equity.