CAPITAL MOBILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A PANEL DATA APPROACH

In this paper we are primarily concerned with assessing the degree of capital mobility in sub‐Saharan Africa. Using the methodology as proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980)—later termed the “Feldstein‐Horioka puzzle”—we test the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility against the alternative of imperfect capital mobility. Following Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998) and Isaksson (2000), provision is made in our model to show the dependency of the lesserdeveloped countries on international finance and aid and how a more open economy contributes towards improving the level of capital movement in these countries. We also assess the change in the degree of capital mobility over the time period in an effort to see whether institutional and political changes have been successful. We show that, compared to the region, South Africa is, to a large extent, more developed and should therefore play a leading role in the “African Renaissance”. Stationary panel data estimation techniques are applied to a sample of 36 sub‐Saharan African countries over the time period 1980–2000. The benefits of using one‐way error component models are derived from simultaneously employing time and cross‐section dimensions of the data, resulting in a substantial increase in the degrees of freedom. The fixed and random effects models enable us to acknowledge country heterogeneity within the panel, making provision for differences across countries like capital control policies, financial and capital market structures and exchange rate regimes.     

Economic Impacts of Supply Management: Review and Comparison of Alternative Measures of Consumer Welfare Loss

Previous measures of the welfare impacts of supply-restricting marketing boards in Canada were rather simplistic but, in this study, it is shown that the simple measures are a close approximation of the true welfare loss. The empirical results suggest that consumer surplus is a relatively good measure of equivalent or compensating variation – a measure of the true loss in welfare. It is estimated that consumers probably lose between $1.01 and $1.14 for every $1 transferred to producers as a result of marketing boards in poultry products and eggs. Les measures antérieures des incidences, sur le bien-être, des offices de gestion des approvisionnements au Canada étaient plutôt simplistes. Dans la préterite étude, nous démontrons cependant qu'elles représentaient tout de même une excellente approximation de ?effet négatif réel sur le bien-être. Nos résultats empiriques donnent à conclure que le surplus à la consommation est une mesure relativement exacte de la variation équivalente au compensatoire, une mesure de la perte réelle au chapitre du bien-être. On calcule que les consommateurs perdent probablement entre 1, 01 $ et 1, 14 $ pour chaque dollar transféré aux producteurs par suite de ?intervention des offices de commercialisation dans les secteurs des oeufs et de la volaille.     

Bartering Games in the Kolm Triangle

We study a public good mechanism that possesses several attractive properties. In particular, the mechanism always produces feasible allocations, induces a game where the Nash equilibria are all individually rational, and, in contrast to the voluntary contribution mechanism, supports the Lindahl allocation as a Nash equilibrium allocation. The geometric framework of the Kolm triangle is employed to illustrate the workings of the mechanism and provide intuition for the main results.     

An Anatomy of Commodity Futures Risk Premia

We identify two types of risk premia in commodity futures returns: spot premia related to the risk in the underlying commodity, and term premia related to changes in the basis. Sorting on forecasting variables such as the futures basis, return momentum, volatility, inflation, hedging pressure, and liquidity results in sizable spot premia between 5% and 14% per annum and term premia between 1% and 3% per annum. We show that a single factor, the high‐minus‐low portfolio from basis sorts, explains the cross‐section of spot premia. Two additional basis factors are needed to explain the term premia.     

Market Games in Successive Oligopolies

This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley–Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenarios as well as a welfare analysis.