Rate of Return Regulation: The Case of Spanish Ports

An original model is put forward in this article to explain and consider the behavior of some of the most important public services in Spain. The cost function approach and the input distance function approach are used to estimate the existence of overcapitalization as a result of rate of return regulation. The results show that overcapitalization generated by this regulation is too significant not to be taken into account.     

Modeling Cyclical Asymmetries in European Imports

This paper applies smooth transition models to capture the nonlinear behavior in the imports data of six major European economies and to assess whether such nonlinearities are related to business cycle asymmetries. Two classes of switch between regimes are considered: endogenously determined transition that assumes nonlinearities are generated by idiosyncratic components specific to foreign trade, and exogenous transition based on GDP growth as a more direct indicator of the cyclical state of the economy. The results support the proposition that the dynamics of imports are nonlinear. In Belgium, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, regimes change over the business cycle, while in Germany and Italy the switch between regimes is endogenous. National characteristics play a role in defining the position of extreme regimes, the smoothness of the transition, and local dynamics within each state.Previous versions of this article have been presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference (Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14, 2004) and at the VII Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Vigo, Spain, June 3–5, 2004). The authors thank the conference participants and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

The structure of bias in peer voting systems: lessons from the Eurovision Song Contest

This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of jury members or peer voters affect the outcomes of voting systems. In particular, we analyze to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is available. In contrast to earlier studies we analyze the impact of common factors on the bias individually for each country, which is necessary to substantiate the publicly debated accusations of regional block voting by certain groups of countries. We establish strong evidence for voting bias in the song contest on the basis of geography, even after correction for culture, language, religion and ethnicity. However, these effects do generally not correspond to the usual accusations. We believe that our findings extend to all instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain common factors, which may cause voting bias. It is important to identify such structures explicitly, as it can help avoiding bias in the first place. The authors are grateful to Marieke van Dijk for excellent research assistance and to Laurens Swinkels, Ieva Pudane, Gijsbert van Lomwel, Jelena Stefanovic, and Bas van den Heuvel for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an invertible (increasing symmetric pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium that facilitates the seller’s learning. A unique invertible bidding equilibrium exists for the Dutch auction format, but only when the second auction is sufficiently discounted by the bidders. In the equilibrium, high-valuation bidders shade their bids down as if the second auction were guaranteed. To counter such strategic bidding, the seller would value ex-ante commitment to hold the second auction less often. Three forms of such commitment are analyzed: commitment to list future auctions in advance, commitment to not hold the second auction unless the first price exceeds a publicly announced threshold, and commitment to a reserve-price in the second auction. I would like to thank Georgios Katsenos, Thomas Jeitschko, Miguel Villas-Boas, George Deltas, and an anonymous referee for thorough and insightful feedback.     

Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium

In general rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (Econometrica 47:655–678, 1978) in an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie setting with uncertainty, does not exist. Moreover, it fails to be fully Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and is also not implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 26:765–791, 2005). The lack of all the above properties is mainly due to the fact that the agents are supposed to predict the equilibrium market clearing price (as agent’s expected maximized utility is conditioned on the information that equilibrium prices reveal), which leads inevitably to the presumption that agents know all the primitives in the economy, i.e., random initial endowments, random utility functions and private information sets. To get around this problematic equilibrium notion, we introduce a new concept called Bayesian–Walrasian equilibrium (BWE) which has Bayesian features. In particular, agents try to predict the market-clearing prices using Bayesian updating and evaluate their consumption in terms of Bayesian price estimates, which are different for each individual. In this framework agents maximize expected utility conditioned on their own private information about the state of nature, subject to a Bayesian estimated budget constraint. Market clearing is not an intrinsic part of the definition of BWE. However, both in the case of perfect foresight and in the case of symmetric information BWE leads to a statewise market clearing; it then becomes an ex post Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This new BWE exists under standard assumptions, in contrast to the REE. In particular, we show that our new BWE exists in the well-known example in Kreps (J Econ Theory 14:32–43, 1977), where REE fails to exist. This work was done in the Spring of 2005, when EJB was a visiting professor at the University of Illinois.     

Transaction cost economics and the roles of national culture: a test of hypotheses based on Inglehart and Hofstede

Transaction cost economics (TCE) is probably the most widely accepted theory on how firms can gain competitive advantage through efficient organization of their economic transactions. However, by focusing on the competitive environment in which companies operate, it abstracts from the cultural context in which governance decisions are made. We study the cultural boundedness of TCE using two seminal cultural theories: the political science/sociology framework of Inglehart and the management science framework of Hofstede. We use these theories to develop (main-effect) hypotheses about the cultural contexts in which TCE has higher predictive power as well as (interaction) hypotheses regarding particular cultural contexts that may inherently be more inclined than others to adopt certain non-market governance modes if the market “fails.” Hypotheses are tested using a meta-analysis on data collected from 128 studies from 12 countries on 3 continents, representing governance decisions of 60,926 companies. We find that TCE is a universal theory across all cultural contexts. This being said, we find that in societies low on power distance and in societies characterized by a strong emphasis on secular-rational and self-expression values, companies are more strongly guided in their governance decisions by economic, transaction-cost considerations than companies in societies high on power distance and in countries that are characterized by traditional and survival values. Further, TCE’s power to predict the specific type of non-market governance employed by the firm is systematically moderated by the national culture in which the firm operates. The power of TCE for predicting hierarchical governance is higher in countries that rate high on secular-rational values and on uncertainty avoidance and low on long-term orientation, whereas TCE is more diagnostic for predicting relational governance in countries high on self-expression values and low on power distance and on uncertainty avoidance. In sum, our meta-analysis provides support for our thesis that to fully understand governance choices made by firms, we need to integrate TCE and cultural theory. While managers around the world are guided by economic considerations, the cultural context in which they operate exerts a substantial—and predictable—contingent effect on their governance choices.     

Perceived marketing–sales relationship effectiveness: a matter of justice

There is a compelling need to improve the relationship between managers in marketing and sales departments. This paper argues that one critical way of enhancing individual managers’ perceptions of relationship effectiveness between these departments is to view the issue as a matter of justice and suggests that perceived marketing–sales relationship effectiveness is positively influenced by managers’ perceptions of organizational justice. Furthermore, it proposes that interfunctional communication has the potential to enhance the proposed positive effects of justice and hence needs to be considered and effectively managed when looking at marketing–sales relationship effectiveness. Data drawn from a survey of 203 marketing and sales managers in 38 consumer packaged goods companies are used to empirically test these predictions. The authors find that perceived sales–marketing relationship effectiveness is influenced by perceptions of distributive, procedural and interactional justice. Greater interfunctional communication is found to further enhance the positive effects of distributive and procedural justice on perceived relationship effectiveness, but it does not contribute to the already strong positive effects of interactional justice. Furthermore, results reveal important differences in the effects of justice on perceived relationship effectiveness across the marketing and sales departments.     

Worth waiting for: increasing satisfaction by making consumers wait

A truism in the marketing literature, and among many marketing practitioners, is that requiring consumers to wait negatively impacts quality evaluations, purchase intentions and a range of other important outcomes. However, it is also true that consumer waiting or queuing has historically been considered from an operations perspective. The present research takes a different approach and examines waits in the context of their ability to function as a signal of quality. Four experiments demonstrate a required wait can indeed signal quality to consumers and increase, rather than decrease, both purchase intentions and actual experienced satisfaction. Three moderators of this effect are examined: preexisting knowledge, consumption motivations, and the extent to which quality is difficult to objectively determine. The results suggest in situations where quality is important, unknown or ambiguous, managers may increase consumer satisfaction by making consumers wait.     

The effectiveness of publicity versus advertising: a meta-analytic investigation of its moderators

This study provides an answer to the question whether and under which conditions publicity is more or less effective than advertising. Advertising refers to paid communication that identifies the message sponsor, whereas publicity is communication that secures editorial space in media for promotion purposes and does not have an identifiable sponsor. The primary advantage of advertising over publicity is the sponsor’s control over message content; its disadvantages are audience skepticism and lack of credibility. We investigate this trade-off between credibility effects and effects of recipients’ processing and evaluation of message content. Results of a meta-analytic structural equation model show that the positive credibility effect of publicity is on average about three times as strong as the information evaluation effect, supporting the overall superiority of publicity over advertising. This effect, however, is moderated by prior knowledge and only holds for products about which recipients lack prior knowledge. The effects change for known products when advertising becomes superior. The effectiveness of publicity depends on further moderating variables. In particular, academic studies tend to underestimate the true effects of publicity over advertising due to experimental manipulations. Campaigns that combine publicity and advertising weaken the effects of publicity, whereas advertorials (i.e., advertisements disguised as editorial material) are more effective, since they combine the advantages of both publicity and advertising. The results have theoretical and practical implications.