Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal systems: Analytic results and experimental evidence

This paper discusses eight alternative tests of the absence of casual ordering, all of which are asymptotically valid under the null hypothesis in the sense that their limiting size is known. Their behavior under alternatives is compared analytically using the concept of approximate slope, and these results are supported by the outcomes of Monte Carlo experiments. The implications of these comparisons for applied work are unambiguous: Wald variants of a test attributed to Granger, and a lagged dependent variable version of Sim's test introduced in this paper, are equivalent in all relevant respects and are preferred to the other tests discussed.     

Hedging spot fuel oil in Singapore: Will the new SIMEX contract succeed?

We assess SIMEX's new market for fuel oil futures by examining its effectiveness in hedging a cash fuel oil position in Singapore. We find that the SIMEX contract can eliminate about two-thirds of the volatility of a Singapore cash position and is many times more effective than a cross-hedge constructed with overseas contracts. Given its potential usefulness as a hedging tool for the regional petroleum industry, we anticipate that the new contract will be a success.We are grateful to Mobil (New York) for making the Platt oil price data available to us and to Jim Bovenage specifically for accessing the data for us.     

What's wrong with executive compensation? A roundtable moderated by Charles Elson

The value that many superpaid CEO superstars supposedly created has largely disappeared, and the likelihood that it will be recovered anytime soon seems remote. On top of that, a good number of top executives treated their companies like ATMs, awarding themselves millions of dollars in corporate perks. It's hard to dispute the idea that executives were corrupted by the sums of money dangled in front of them. What's wrong with executive compensation, and what can we do about it? HBR and the University of Delaware's Center for Corporate Governance convened a round-table of compensation experts last October on the university's campus in Newark, Delaware. The 12 panelists, from CEOs to investors, from the professionals who advise them to a chief justice who rules on their disputes, provided an extraordinary diversity of viewpoints. The panelist began by debating ways to align the interests of the senior executives with the long-term interests of the company-weighing the relative benefits of stock options versus stock grants, for instance. But the discussion expanded to cover broader questions of corporate governance and company values. "The main reason compensation increases every year is that most boards want their CEO to be in the top half of the CEO peer group," said Ed Woolard,Jr., a former CEO of DuPont. And compensation lawyer Joe Bachelder pointed out the danger of structuring pay in such a way that it dampens risk taking among executives. It was a lively and wide-ranging discussion of one business's most pressing issues.