The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Benefits and Costs of Auditor's Assurance: Evidence from the Review of Quarterly Financial Statements

Even though there is a worldwide consensus as to the necessity of an audit of annual financial statements for public companies, there is divergence of views as to the review of interim financial statements. While some jurisdictions make it mandatory (e.g., Australia, France, United States), others allow the review without requiring it (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom). Using a sample of companies listed in Canada, we examine the costs associated with these reviews and the benefits they generate in terms of improvement in the quality of interim financial statements for the years 2004 and 2005. Controlling for the decision to purchase the reviews, we find that audit fees are 18 percent higher for firms with interim reviews and, contrary to many regulators' assumption, we find no evidence that this cost increase is proportionally higher for smaller firms. Regarding the benefits of interim reviews, we find no significant association between either accruals‐ or nonaccruals‐based measures of earnings management and the fact that the interim statements are reviewed by the auditor, neither in the interim reports nor in those of the fourth quarter. The results suggest that auditors' involvement with interim reports may not be as effective as previously thought at controlling the quality of interim financial statements.     

The making of a fiscal state in Song China, 960–1279

In light of the Schumpeterian paradigm, this article explores the rise of the tax state in eleventh‐century China and its further transition towards a fiscal state until the Mongol conquest in 1279. By the late eleventh century in the Song dynasty, two‐thirds of state revenues came from taxing non‐agricultural sectors, especially from the collection of excise. The Song state became the first sustainable tax state in global history, as manifested in three major aspects: monetization; indirect taxation; and centralization and professionalization in the tax administration. The boundary of the Song tax state was largely confined to urban settlements. In rural areas, the state gave up the collection of commercial taxes by farming out this right to local elites. In the twelfth century, as traditional tax revenues fell far short of supporting military defence, the Song administration utilized credit instruments. Around 1200, the amount of redeemable promissory notes first exceeded that of annual tax revenues. This shift from tax‐based public finance to credit‐based public finance completed the transition towards a fiscal state. Nonetheless, this development in the fiscal state was still at an early stage and proved to be unstable. Toward the end of the Southern Song, hyperinflation caused by the over‐issuance of promissory notes seriously threatened the economy.     

The Discriminating Beta: Prices and Capacity with Correlated Demands

Uniform customer‐class pricing can do much of the work of congestion‐based or time‐of‐day pricing in communication or wireless networks. A monopolist exploits differences in the stochastic characteristics of demands. If demands are correlated and the firm faces a capacity constraint, then it can set prices to reduce the variability of aggregate demand, thereby reducing the probability of excess demand and the associated service quality deterioration. Demands that covary negatively with aggregate demand are valuable to the firm in much the same way that securities that covary negatively with the market are valuable in a stock portfolio. Customer classes that exhibit low covariance with aggregate demand realize lower optimal prices. Optimal capacity is also affected by these covariances. As long as demands are not perfectly positively correlated, expected costs of joint production are less than expected costs of serving demands separately.     

U.S. Auditors' Perceptions of the PCAOB Inspection Process: A Behavioral Examination

This study examines U.S. auditors' observations of the PCAOB inspection process, and its impact on their work, in order to understand the current U.S. regulatory audit climate. Using 20 interviews with experienced auditors, we consider behavioral factors (e.g., perceived power of and trust in the PCAOB) that can impact the level and form of auditor compliance according to theory from the slippery slope framework on audit regulation (Kirchler et al. 2008; Dowling et al. 2018). Our participants described an audit climate with a powerful regulator. They reported that their desire to receive “clean” inspection reports has had a substantial impact on audit procedures and quality control. However, our participants do not appear to have high trust in the PCAOB, as they questioned aspects of the inspection process and its expectations. Accordingly, we conclude that U.S. public company auditors operate in an antagonistic environment in which auditors perceive the PCAOB has high coercive power. In other words, they comply due to fear of enforcement rather than agreement with the PCAOB's views on audit quality. Some auditors also indicated that they consider both the costs and benefits of compliance. Theoretical intuition implies that any future increases to perceived costs relative to perceived benefits of compliance could ultimately decrease the PCAOB's coercive power and reduce U.S. auditor compliance. Our findings have implications for regulators and researchers interested in understanding behavioral factors that may influence regulatory compliance.