FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE: THE OPPORTUNITY CURVE

A model depicting first-mover dynamics is proposed wherein certain types of strategic barriers activated by the first-mover strategy figure prominently in preserving benefits in the time dimension. Strategic barriers conferring singularity (i.e. one-time benefit) are considered to be the most effective preservers of first-mover advantage. the theoretical model is tested empirically in a study of six major industries. Benefits operationalized as industry share and profit share were found to decline consistently with industry age according to an exponential function designated the opportunity curve.     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.     

Measurement error and panel data1

The underidentification of linear models with measurement error does not necessarily extend to panel data models, as has been shown by GAiliches and Hausman (1986). We discuss and extend some of their results for a simple case and address particular issues concerning identification and asymptotic variances.     

A note on securities market response to pension fund termination*

Abstract. A recent article in this journal (Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen, 1990) presents evidence demonstrating that financially distressed firms that terminate overfunded pension plans experience significantly positive abnormal returns, while nondistressed terminating firms experience returns not different from zero. The article concludes from this evidence that the market regards the property rights to excess assets as residing fully with the sponsoring firm prior to termination, particularly when the sponsoring firm is not financially distressed. Accordingly, the reporting requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 88, which require immediate recognition of gains resulting from termination, are inconsistent with the market's view of the ownership rights to excess plan assets. Similarly, the article suggests that the excise tax imposed on asset reversions is “punitive” because property rights to fund assets resided with the company prior to termination. This paper questions three aspects of the Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen article: (1) the plausibility of the theory explaining differential reaction to the announcement to terminate for distressed and nondistressed firms; (2) the effect of the distressed/nondistressed classification criteria, event date specification, and event window length on the results; and (3) the appropriateness of using the empirical results, if reliable, to evaluate accounting treatment or federal tax policy. Résumé. Dans un récent article paru dans cette même publication, Hsieh, Ferris et Chen (1990) soumettaient des faits démontrant que les entreprises en difficulté financière qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite surprovisionné enregistrent des rendements anormaux positifs importants, tandis que les entreprises qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite sans être en difficulté financière enregistrent des rendements qui ne sont pas différents de zéro. De là, les auteurs concluaient que le marché estime que les droits à l'excédent d'actif appartiennent exclusivement à l'entreprise responsable du régime avant la cessation, en particulier lorsque cette dernière n'est pas en difficulté financière. Par conséquent, les exigences de la norme SFAS No. 88 en matière d'information à fournir, qui prévoient la constatation immédiate du produit de la cessation du régime, ne sont pas conformes à la façon de voir du marché relativement aux droits à l'excédent d'actif du régime. De la même façon, selon les auteurs, la taxe d'accise imposée en cas de retour de l'actif est “punitive”, étant donné que les droits à l'actif du régime appartenaient à l'entreprise avant la cessation du régime. Les auteurs s'interrogent ici sur trois aspects de l'article de Hsieh, Ferris, et Chen: 1) la pertinence de la théorie expliquant la réaction marginale à l'annonce de la cessation d'un régime pour les entreprise qui sont en difficulté financière et celles qui ne le sont pas; 2) l'incidence sur les résultats des critères permettant de classer les entreprises comme étant en difficulté financière ou ne l‘étant pas, de la précision de la date de l’événement et de la longueur de la période pré-post relative à l‘événement; et 3) l'opportunité de l'utilisation des résultats empiriques, s'ils sont fiables, pour évaluer le traitement comptable ou la politique fiscale fédérale.     

Stock Market Reactions to SFAS No. 96: Evidence from Early Bank Adopters

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 96, “Accounting for Income Taxes,” issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in December 1987 changed accounting for income tax recognition and accrual. The original deadline for implementation of SFAS No. 96 was December 15, 1988, and earlier adoption was encouraged. This study examines empirically the stock price impact of four pertinent announcement dates regarding SFAS No. 96 for 19 banks that adopted the statement in late 1987 and early 1988. Our results suggest that these early bank adopters have different characteristics from other banks that cause them to benefit from the changes in accounting for deferred taxes and explain their voluntary adoption of the standard.