The economics of dying: A misapplication of tools

Conclusions Unlike McKenzie and Tullock, we do not know how personsshould treat their bodily organs or what is an ideal exit. That depends upon their utility goals, which are defined in output terms specific to the decision maker. We contend that the body is an input into the utility production process, and therefore, as with any input, it must be maintained and repaired at a level consistent with the output goals for maximization of utility. Thus, from this framework, it is quite consistent for a person to die with healthy organs without any thought of belief in reincarnation or the desire to bequeath one's bodily organs to others, or religious values. Self interest is all that must prevail.Also, the fact that there are interrelationships between the organs in the system, and at points these relationships take on fixed factor characteristics such that reduced levels of operation in one organ can create disorientation or coma or damage to other organs, means that the body cannot die as M-T suggest. Zero capacity for all organs at death is a technical impossibility as well as being inconsistent with the output goals of utility maximizers.     

Building more business with industrial direct mail advertising

One of the most effective tools of promotion in industrial markets, though often misused and little understood, is the proper use of direct mail. This article focuses upon the major considerations, with numerous examples, for planning and executing different direct mail programs.     

Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown

Theory suggests that economic instruments, such as pollution taxes or tradable permits, can provide more efficient technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory standards. We explore this issue for an important industry undergoing dramatic decreases in allowed pollution – the U.S. petroleum industry's phasedown of lead in gasoline. Using a duration model applied to a panel of refineries from 1971–1995, we find that the pattern of technology adoption is consistent with an economic response to market incentives, plant characteristics, and alternative policies. Importantly, evidence suggests that the tradable permit system used during the phasedown provided incentives for more efficient technology adoption decisions.     

Dividend Pricing Models and REITs

Dividend pricing/present value models relate current stock prices to expectations of future dividends. In this study we apply the West and Campbell–Shiller tests of the dividend pricing relation to an index of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs provide a unique test of these models since, during our study period, REITs were mandated to pay out at least 95% of taxable income as dividends. While our results complement previous research which finds that the dividend pricing model cannot be rejected if share repurchase is included as part of dividends, our data contain a much less significant amount of share repurchase, so that our approach to the issue of the viability of dividend pricing models offers an alternative insight. Our research suggests that, for our REIT population, dividend pricing models cannot be rejected.     

火电厂竞争力评价与分析

通过对影响火电厂竞争力的主要因素的分析,提出了火电厂竞争力评价的简化指标体系,并进行算例分析,提出了相应结论和建议。     

Valuation of SGARAs IN THE Wine Industry: Time for Sober Reflection

The application of AASB 1037 Self Generating and Regenerating Assets provides little guidance to the commercial performance of winemakers. The valuation of grapevines essentially requires the valuation of a segment of a business (vineyards), from which is deducted the value of associated infrastructure. Grapevines are reported at a fictional "net market value" even though they cannot be bought or sold. The combination of recognising revaluation increments as distributable profits through the valuation of grapevines at "net market value", and the subsequent "amortisation" of those revaluation increments over the useful lives of the grapevines, creates a reporting maze which is more likely to confuse than inform.     

The effects of funding source and management ownership on the productivity of R&D

This study investigates the influence of the source of R&D funds and management ownership on R&D productivity. The lagged effect of the source of R&D funds on R&D output is investigated for a sample of US manufacturing firms in five industries over the 1996–99 period. Estimates based on 779 firm-years show that R&D productivity increases with the proportion of stock held by managers and directors of firms primarily in the Other Electronics industry. The estimates also show that recipients of government-sponsored R&D funds in the Chemicals industry have lower levels of output (sales) for each dollar committed to R&D. In addition, output for firms in the Chemicals industry worsens as management stockholding increases, implying an agency cost rationale for the observed difference in output. The implication is that firms with high manager-owner content are less productive with government-sponsored R&D than with company-financed R&D. The reported results suggest that potential agency costs should be incorporated in government-sponsored R&D contracts. It also suggests that the source of R&D funds should be disclosed and incorporated into the valuation of intangible assets attributable to research and development.     

Agricultural Extension: Good Intentions and Hard Realities

What considerations lead policymakers to invest in agriculturalextension as a key public responsibility, and what factors andagency incentives explain differences in extension system performance?To help answer these questions, this article provides a frameworkoutlining farmers' demand for information, the public goodscharacter of extension services, and the organizational andpolitical attributes affecting the performance of extensionsystems. This conceptual framework is used to analyze severalextension modalities and their likely and actual effectiveness.The analysis highlights the efficiency gains that can come fromlocally decentralized delivery systems with incentive structuresbased on largely private provision, although in most poorercountries extension services will remain publicly funded.