Asymptotic behavior of the estimated weights and of the estimated performance measures of the minimum VaR and the minimum CVaR optimal portfolios for dependent data

In this paper we derive the asymptotic distributions of the estimated weights and of estimated performance measures of the minimum value-at-risk portfolio and of the minimum conditional value-at-risk portfolio assuming that the asset returns follow a strictly stationary process. It is proved that the estimated weights as well as the estimated performance measures are asymptotically multivariate normally distributed. We also present an asymptotic test for the weights and a joint test for the characteristics of both portfolios. Moreover, the asymptotic densities of the estimated performance measures are compared with the corresponding exact densities. It is shown that the asymptotic approximation performs well even for the moderate sample size.     

TRADE INTEGRATION,OUTSOURCING AND EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRIA: A DECOMPOSITION APPROACH

Outsourcing and trade integration of advanced countries is debated with respect to employment effects, in particular for low educated workers – at least in relative terms. We study the employment effects – differentiated by educational attainment levels – of changes in the patterns of trade integration and outsourcing in the Austrian economy over the periods 1995–2000 and 2000–2005 using hierarchical decomposition analysis based on deflated input–output tables. Outsourcing is modeled as changes in the shares of domestically produced intermediates in total intermediates. A similar decomposition of the final demand vector allows us to draw conclusions on the overall employment effects of trade integration. The results suggest that the expected negative employment effects of outsourcing and rising import penetration have been overcompensated by increasing exports. Thus, the overall employment effects of Austrian trade integration have been positive for all educational attainment groups. However, whereas the total effects have been strongest for medium and high educated workers over the period 1995–2000, employment of low educated workers have been strongest and positively affected over the period 2000–2005. This pattern can be explained by a more sluggish export performance together with stronger negative effects of outsourcing and import penetration in medium and high-skill intensive products.     

Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production

The tendency to underestimate others' relative performance compared with one's own is widespread among individuals in all work environments. We examine the relationship between, and the driving forces behind, individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender‐specific link: overconfident men hold more optimistic beliefs about coworkers' cooperativeness than men who lack confidence and are accordingly significantly more cooperative, whereas overconfidence, beliefs, and cooperativeness are not correlated in women. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Contest rules are set up by administrators who frequently have discretionary power in specifying the details of these rules, i.e., they can bias the contest rules toward specific contestants in order to further their prime objective. We derive the optimal bias of the contest rule for a contest administrator, who is interested in maximizing the total efforts expended in the contest. The solution is obtained in closed form for a widely used class of n-person contest games. Setting the optimal bias has important implications: (i) there is never exclusion of strong players, instead there is (endogenously induced) inclusion of weak contestants; (ii) the contest administrator will optimally level the playing field by encouraging weak contestants, but he will not equalize the contestants’ chances unless they are identical; and (iii) at least three contestants will be active in equilibrium of the optimal contest, irrespective of heterogeneity.     

Can below-replacement fertility be desirable?

In this paper, we challenge the widespread notion that replacement level fertility is the most desirable level of fertility both for countries currently above and below this level. We discuss possible alternative criteria for choosing one fertility level over another. In accordance with earlier studies, we focus on age dependency as the sole criterion. But we do so by relaxing the strong assumption that all individuals of a given age are equal in terms of their economic contribution to society and introduce education as probably the most relevant observable source of population heterogeneity. Our criterion variable is the education-weighted support ratio and we perform thousands of alternative simulations for different constant levels of fertility, starting from empirically given populations. If education is assumed to present a cost at young age and results in higher productivity during working age, then for most countries the desirable long-term total fertility rate turns out to be well below replacement level.     

IMF surveillance as a signal to attract foreign investment

Poor governance and endemic corruption hamper the efforts of some developing countries to attract foreign investment. Incentive schemes based on verifiable signals of varying costs and quality can be helpful in encouraging their governments to intensify corruption-control efforts. This paper ranks alternative signals, including surveillance by the IMF and other IFIs (International Financial Institutions), as catalysts for private foreign investments. We demonstrate that the ranking crucially depends on the bargaining strength of governments relative to foreign investors. If foreign lenders control the bargain, IFI signals are the first choice. If governments are in control, IFI signals become the choice of last resort.     

Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach

The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45?000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190?000 individuals.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

International Environmental Agreements,Fiscal Federalism,and Constitutional Design

In this paper, we analyze how the prospect of international negotiations over trans‐boundary pollution shapes intracountry transfer schemes when the governments of the countries' polluting regions are in charge of environmental policy and negotiations. Federal governments can implement compensation payments between domestic regions and matching grants prior to the international negotiations between the polluting regions. The subgame‐perfect transfer schemes fail to fully internalize the environmental externality, leading to an inefficient international environmental agreement. As the international spillover increases, the intracountry compensation rates increase while the matching rates decline, distorting the incentives for the regional governments in opposing directions. We also show that decentralization of environmental decision making arises endogenously.