Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Tax progression and inequality of income distribution

The Lorenz curve of income after tax is known to dominate the one before tax for all given income distributions if and only if average tax liability is monotone increasing with income. This note provides a general formulation of the equivalence in both, some weak and some strong sense.     

Sources of exchange rate fluctuations with Taylor rule fundamentals

This paper investigates the sources of exchange rate fluctuations when monetary policy follows a Taylor rule interest rate reaction function. We first present a simple dynamic exchange rate model with Taylor rule fundamentals which is triangular in the long-run impacts of shocks to the output market, the interest rate differential, and the Taylor rule. We then proceed to assess the relative importance of various shocks in exchange rate determination by estimating a structural VAR with long-run identification restrictions based on the triangular structure of the model. We find demand shocks to be less important than in earlier VAR studies, with both supply shocks and nominal shocks explaining a substantial part of real exchange rate fluctuations.     

Complexity Economics as Heterodoxy: Theory and Policy

Complexity economics has quickly become a powerful research program for real-world economics in recent years. This article provides an overview of complexity economics, and argues that it is incompatible with the “equilibrium” and “optimality” conceptions of the mainstream and its “market economy.” Instead, it develops older heterodox — including evolutionary-institutional — issues like self-organization, emergence, path?dependence, idiosyncrasies, lock-ins, or skewed power distributions. Also, the space for emergent institutions through the “intentionality” of agents, including their improving collective performance, reducing complexity, and others, is investigated. This article considers complex adaptive systems through “games on networks” in an “evolution-of-cooperation” perspective. Moreover, a surge in policy implications of economic complexity has emerged, even if still rather general. With some more specific implications derived, the article again reveals the close similarities with long-standing heterodoxies: namely, pragmatist policy conceptions in this respect.     

The CAP is Destroying the EEC

The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Economic Community threatens to pull Europe apart. Seven eminent German economists, the Kronberger Kreis, demonstrate the political and economic tailings of the CAP. They argue in this short version prepared by Dr klaus Peter Krause of a book to be published in German that without radical reform the CAP will continue to generate massive wastage, subvent the efforts of farmers throughout the Community, provoke widespread political tension both inside and outside the Community, and force unnecessarily high prices on consumers. Two British commentators examine the importance of the Kronberger Kreis Supplement for the agricultural markets in Europe and the Third World.