Privatization, insider control and managerial entrenchment in Russia

This paper provides new survey evidence on managerial entrenchment and the role of outsiders in the post-privatization restructuring of Russian enterprises. The major findings are that managers are hostile towards outside ownership, and they effectively collude with other employees to preserve insider control. The paper also provides empirical evidence that the gradual accumulation of shares by managers is not based only on a profit motive, but is also driven by their efforts to preserve insider control. The issues raised have relevance to other transition economies where the privatization process has encouraged insider control, such as Ukraine and Belarus.     

How Useful Are the Strategic Tools We Teach in Business Schools?

Strategic tools are indispensible for business and competitive analysis. Yet we know very little about managers' internal logic as they put these tools into practical use. We situate our study in a business school context using action learning prior to the manifestation of practice to complement our understanding of practice. Using Personal Construct Theory and Repertory Grids, our mid‐range theorizing showed that, contrary to current thinking about strategic tools, managers think in dualities (often paradoxically) and have a preference for multiple‐tools‐in‐use, tools that provide different perspectives, peripheral vision, connected thinking, simultaneously help differentiate and integrate complex issues, and guide the thinking process. These findings are important for designing better tools and the nurturing of critical managerial competencies needed for a complicated world. Our study's focus also has wider implications for scholars as we see our own material evaluated by those who will put these lessons into practice.     

Exchange rate forecasting: the errors we’ve really made

We examine the real-time forecasting performance of standard exchange rate models, using dozens of different vintages of data. Favorable evidence of long-horizon exchange rate predictability for the DM and Yen found in Mark (American Economic Review 1995;85:201-218) is present in only a two-year window of data vintages around that originally used. Approximately one-third of the improved forecasting performance over a random walk is eventually undone by data revisions. We also find the models consistently perform better using original release data than fully-revised data, and sometimes forecast better using real-time forecasts of future fundamentals instead of actual future fundamentals, contradicting a cherished presumption dating back to Meese and Rogoff (Journal of International Economics 1983;14:3-24).     

Information Sharing,Price Negotiation and Management Buy-outs of Private Family-owned Firms

Perspectives relating to agency theory, information asymmetries and game theory were utilized to explore two outcomes associated with the management buy-out (MBO) or management buy-in (MBI) of former private firms: whether information was shared equally between vendors (i.e., family firm owners) and purchasers (i.e., MBO/I management teams) and whether a mutually agreed price was achieved. With reference to the themes of company ownership structure, governance structure and company objectives several hypotheses were derived. Survey evidence was gathered from the managers of 114 former private family-owned firms located across Europe that recently reported an MBO/I. Multiple logistic regression analysis detected that respondents in founded (first generation) family firms and those reporting a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment were more likely to report that ‘information was shared equally between vendors and purchasers’. Respondents reporting no suitable family successor had been identified, a high focus on the strategic importance of the market value increment, and the involvement of venture capitalists in succession planning were more likely to report that a mutually agreed sale price had been achieved. Implications for practitioners and researchers are discussed.      

The Ability and Willingness Paradox in Family Firm Innovation

We present a framework of how family involvement influences innovation management based on ability (discretion to act) and willingness (disposition to act), two drivers that distinguish family firms from nonfamily firms and lead to heterogeneity among family firms. Paradoxically, family firms have superior ability yet lower willingness to engage in technological innovation. Resolving this paradox should yield new insights about innovation management in general. We summarize and position the papers in this special issue according to these drivers and set out an agenda for further research that will contribute to a better understanding of family firms' heterogeneous and paradoxical behaviors.     

The Optimal Timing of Evaluation of Genebank Accessions and the Effects of Biotechnology

The lack of ex ante evaluation of germplasm in genebanks has been the single most prevalent and long-standing complaint of plant breeders about the management of genebanks. Advances in biotechnology offer the possibility of faster, cheaper and more efficient evaluation methodologies. Will these new technologies favor ex post evaluation, as some expect, or will it lead to more ex ante evaluation? Will it also lead to earlier development of varieties with disease resistance traits in anticipation of actual infestations? Will the prospect of further advances in biotechnology favor delay of evaluation and development? This paper addresses these questions in the case of evaluation of germplasm for resistance to a disease.