产品责任制度中产品的界定及完善

我国产品责任制度中产品的范畴较之国际产品责任立法过于狭隘,在明晰我国产品责任法所涉产品与国际相关产品立法中产品范围的界定的基础上,阐述我国产品责任法对产品范围的取舍及改进意见。     

Sunk Costs and the Entry Decision

This paper considers the role of sunk costs in the decision to enter a market. Its goal is to provide a policy-relevant approach to the question: when are sunk costs so great as to serve as a barrier to entry? To do this, the model presented nests both a model of pure hit-and-run entry and a simple “lottery-ticket” model of long-term entry in which the entrant knows that entry may or may not ultimately prove successful. It illustrates clearly the strategic differences between sunk and nonsunk fixed costs. The paper also considers the incumbent’s problem of choosing between entry deterrence and accommodation. Finally, out of this model comes a measure of the height of the sunk cost barrier to entry that may be useful for competition policy purposes.     

Environmental social controls and capital investments: Australian evidence

Environmental social controls (ESCs) such as mandatory disclosure, regulations, subsidies, and stakeholder opinion are intended to improve firm environmental performance. This paper reports ESC importance to Australian financial managers in making capital investment decisions. A decision‐making experiment showed managers to be most responsive to stakeholder opinion (42 per cent), followed by subsidization (26 per cent) and regulatory cost (22 per cent). Mandatory disclosure has very little influence (10 per cent). ESC interaction effects are limited so coordination of ESC policy is not a primary concern. High degrees of managerial self‐insight suggest policy changes would be enhanced by close consultations with the managers involved.     

Science and Environmental Policy-Making: Bias-Proofing the Assessment Process

Scientific assessment panels are playing increasingly influential roles in national and international policy formation. Although they typically appeal to the standard of journal peer review as their quality control criterion, there seems to be confusion about what peer review actually does. It is, at best, a necessary condition of reliability, but not a sufficient condition. There is also the problem that assessment panels may be biased in favor of one side or another when evaluating areas in which the science is unclear. In this paper I argue that additional checks and balances are needed on the information going into scientific assessment reports when it will be used to justify major policy investments. I propose two new mechanisms to bias-proof the outcome: an Audit Panel and a Counterweight Panel. The need for such mechanisms is discussed with reference to the "hockey stick" debate in climate change.