Seemingly inconsistent analyst revisions

In about 20%–30% of cases where an analyst revises two outputs (namely, earnings estimates, target prices, or stock recommendations) simultaneously, the two estimates are revised in opposite directions. Existing literature notes that these inconsistent outputs are widespread, and concludes that they are lower-quality, driven by strategic bias, and are viewed as less valid by investors. We find that these characterizations are generally inaccurate. Apparent inconsistency is largely driven by accounting and economic factors, with only limited evidence that investment banking-related conflicts play a role. Moreover, inconsistent outputs are neither less accurate than consistent outputs nor do they resolve less investor uncertainty upon their release. Overall, our results suggest that researchers should be cautious in interpreting the correlation between analyst outputs as a measure of bias or quality, and in using a single analyst output as a proxy for an analyst's overall views.     

Risk Management,Corporate Governance,and the Search for Long-Term Investors

This discussion explores a number of ways that more effective risk management, corporate governance, and communication with investors can help companies increase their effciency and long-run value. According to one of the panelists, recent surveys of corporate directors suggest that companies should devote more time and attention to three issues—strategy, risk management, and succession planning—and that strategy and risk are the “flipsides of the same coin.” As the panelist argues, “You can't talk about strategy without talking about what risks you're going to take—and what risks you decide to take has to depend on the core competencies that drive the corporate strategy.” In addition to making risk management a critical part of corporate strategy, another notable recommendation is to communicate a company's strategy and business plan as clearly as possible to investors, with the aim of attracting more sophisticated, long-term shareholders. Contrary to popular belief, such a group may well include some hedge funds and other activist shareholders. According to a newly released report on shareholder activism (produced and cited by another panelist), corporate boards should work harder to identify and engage the “largest 10 shareholders in the organization,” with the ultimate goal of cultivating a shareholder base that buys into the company's strategy.     

A reduced PDE method for European option pricing under multi-scale,multi-factor stochastic volatility

The number of tailor-made hybrid structured products has risen more prominently to fit each investor’s preferences and requirements as they become more diversified. The structured products entail synthetic derivatives such as combinations of bonds and/or stocks conditional on how they are backed up by underlying securities, stochastic volatility, stochastic interest rates or exchanges rates. The complexity of these multi-asset structures yields lots of difficulties of pricing the products. Because of the complexity, Monte-Carlo simulation is a possible choice to price them but it may not produce stable Greeks leading to a trouble in hedging against risks. In this light, it is desirable to use partial differential equations with relevant analytic and numerical techniques. Even if the partial differential equation method would generate stable security prices and Greeks for single asset options, however, it may result in the curse of dimensionality when pricing multi-asset derivatives. In this study, we make the best use of multi-scale nature of stochastic volatility to lift the curse of dimensionality for up to three asset cases. Also, we present a transformation formula by which the pricing group parameters required for the multi-asset options in illiquid market can be calculated from the underlying market parameters.     

Microstructure-based manipulation: Strategic behavior and performance of spoofing traders

We examine how investors strategically spoof the stock market by placing orders with little chance of being executed, but which mislead other traders into thinking there is an imbalance in the order book. Using the complete intraday order and trade data of the Korea Exchange (KRX) in a custom data set identifying individual accounts, we find that investors strategically placed spoofing orders which, given the KRX's order-disclosure rule at the time, created the impression of a substantial order book imbalance, with the intent to manipulate subsequent prices. This manipulation, which made use of specific features of the market microstructure, differs from previously studied forms of manipulation based on information or transactions. Roughly half of the spoofing orders were placed in conjunction with day trading. Stocks targeted for manipulation had higher return volatility, lower market capitalization, lower price level, and lower managerial transparency. We also find that spoofing traders achieved substantial extra profits. The frequency of spoofing orders decreased drastically after the KRX altered its order-disclosure rule.     

Does corporate diversification reduce value in high technology firms?

We find that firm value is reduced via industrial diversification and this reduction in value depends upon a firm’s technology intensity. We consider that asymmetric information problems are more severe in technology intensive industries and find that high tech industry firms present distinctly larger value reduction when compared to low tech industry firms. The negative valuation effect is greater for firms that have a relatively larger amount of intangible assets and greater R&D capital. We determine that our findings are robust to different estimation methods and alternative excess value measures.