Crime,Terror and Corruption and Their Effect on Private Investment in Israel

There are a number of mechanisms through which illegal activity can affect economic activity. Until now, most empirical research that has attempted to quantify the negative effects of illegal activity on economic performance has used international cross-section comparisons. The present study is apparently the first attempt in the literature to examine directly the effects of crime and corruption (and one of few to examine the effects of terror) on private investment by examining the behavior of investors over time in a specific country within a structured model of investment. Israel was chosen as the subject of the study. According to international indexes, Israel’s status as a civil society has degraded over the past decade and according to the corruption index of Transparency International, it is now ranked 33rd in the world. The results of the research can serve as the basis for comparison in similar studies of other Western countries. The study’s conclusions support the hypothesis that crime and major (but not sporadic), significant or ongoing, terror events play an important part in determining the investment behavior of firms in Israel, both in the short and the intermediate/long run.     

The value of a stochastic information structure

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each signal given a state. For a fixed decision problem, the value of an information structure is the maximal expected utility that the decision maker can get when the observed signals are governed by this structure. Thus, every decision problem induces a preference order over information structures according to their value. We characterize preference orders that can be obtained in this way. We also characterize the functions defined over information structures that measure their value.     

The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition

This paper considers platform competition in a two‐sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will coordinate on joining it. We find that the degree of the coordination bias affects the platform's decision regarding the business model (i.e., whether to subsidize buyers or sellers), the access fees, and the size of the platform. A slight increase in the coordination bias may induce the advantaged platform to switch from subsidizing sellers to subsidizing buyers, or induce the disadvantaged platform to switch from subsidizing buyers to subsidizing sellers. Moreover, in such a case the advantaged platform switches from oversupplying to undersupplying sellers, and the disadvantaged platform switches from undersupplying to oversupplying sellers.     

Promoting Efficient Rural Financial Intermediation

Although governments have traditionally used subsidized creditprograms to promote agricultural growth, this approach has generallyfailed to improve incomes and alleviate poverty in rural areas.It has also led to the mistaken belief that rural credit programscannot be profitable. A new approach seeks to raise standardsof living in rural areas by casting the government in a veryd role—one of setting a favorable legal andpolicy environmentfor rural financial markets and addressing spec market failurescost effectively through well-designed and self-sustaining interventions.There is evidence that this approach can be highly successful.The Village Bank system of Bank Rakyat Indonesia has shown thatfinancial services can be extended to millions of low-incomerural clients without relying on subsidies. Indeed, the programhas generated enormous profits for the bank by using simple,innovative, and largely replicable techniques.      

A MODEL FOR THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF WATER QUALITY IN IRRIGATION

A model for determination of the efficient combination of water quantity and quality (salinity) in irrigation is presented. The efficient combination is evaluated with respect to a predetermined threshold salt concentration in the soil solution. A leaching model, designed for tracing salt distribution in the soil profile, serves as the basis for the analysis. The optimal quantity-quality combinations are derived with the aid of a linear programming model. An illustrative application of the model concludes the presentation.     

Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.     

Asset prices and business cycles with costly external finance

This paper asks whether the asset pricing fluctuations induced by the presence of costly external finance are empirically plausible. To accomplish this, we incorporate costly external finance into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and explore its implications for the properties of the returns on key financial assets, such as stocks, bonds and risky loans. We find that the mean and volatility of the equity premium, although small, are significantly higher than those in comparable adjustment cost models. However, we also show that these results require a procyclical financing premium, a property that seems at odds with the data.     

Regulating a model

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank’s private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more.     

Asset Pricing Implications of Firms' Financing Constraints

We use a production-based asset pricing model to investigatewhether financing constraints are quantitatively important forthe cross-section of returns. Specifically, we use GMM to explorethe stochastic Euler equation imposed on returns by optimalinvestment. Our methods can identify the impact of financialfrictions on the stochastic discount factor with cyclical variationsin cost of external funds. We find that financing frictionsprovide a common factor that improves the pricing of cross-sectionalreturns. Moreover, the shadow cost of external funds exhibitsstrong procyclical variation, so that financial frictions aremore important in relatively good economic conditions. (JELE22, E44, G12)