Intellectual property right protection in the software market

We discuss the software patent should be granted or not. There exist two types of coping in the software market; reverse engineering and software duplication. Software patent can prevent both types of copies since a patent protects an invention. If the software is not protected by a patent, software producer cannot prevent reverse engineering. However, the producer can prevent the software duplication by a copyright. It is not clear the software patent is socially desirable when we consider these two types of coping. We obtain the following results. First, the number of copy users under the patent protection is greater than that under the copyright protection. Second, the government can increase social welfare by applying copyright protection when the new technology is sufficiently innovative.     

A model of urban demography

This study develops an overlapping generations model that involves the endogenous determination of demographic and city structure to fully analyze the social and natural changes in city populations. We provide conditions under which the model exhibits the spatial features of demography observed in urban areas: city centres have a lower total fertility rate than suburbs and larger cities have a lower total fertility rate than smaller cities. Through calibration, we also show that spatial factors have a significant impact on demographic characteristics and city growth.     

PROBING PARTIAL CHAINING UNDER SPATIAL COMPETITION IN VERTICAL MARKET STRUCTURE

This paper probes impacts of partial chaining upon the cost structures of not only the chained and independent distributors under spatial competition, but also the monopolistic producer who manages differentiated distribution channels for heterogeneous retailers simultaneously. We assume vertically related but decentralized markets in upstream and downstream stages. Upon chaining, market areas of each chained (independent) store increase (decrease), the related retail prices decline (rise) and profits increase (decrease). Chaining also tends to lower the wholesale prices for the chain stores generally. While aggregate consumer surplus increases, profit for the producer not even directly chained also increases. Social surplus increases with chaining at the expense, however , of not only the remaining independent stores and their customers, but also the chain store's own customers partly at the market periphery.     

Jealousy and underconsumption in a one-sector model with wealth preference

The present paper examines the effects of consumption externalities on economic performance in a one-sector model with wealth preference. The presence of the wealth preference generates a wealth effect in consumption growth, which plays a crucial role for consumption externalities to have impacts on the economy. Our main findings are: (i) regardless of the assumption of inelastic labor supply, the distortionary effect of consumption externalities stays in the long run; (ii) the income tax as well as the consumption tax can modify the efficiency; and (iii) the numerical simulations supplement theoretical findings.     

Bowley Duopoly Under Vertical Relations

Compared to the well‐known oligopoly models such as those of Cournot, the so‐called Bowley duopoly is less known, and almost ignored in the literature. This neglect reflects the assumption that as a leader–leader model incorporating apparent excess rivalry it is presumably untenable, at least in theory. However, it is, in fact, observable in practice. Furthermore, the predicted excess competition is not only observable empirically but also accountable theoretically. We show how excess competition emerges when an upstream monopolist offers the downstream retailers a compensated game in which each acts as a leader. The outcome is not only stable but also benefits all involved actors, including consumers under vertically‐related markets, such as those presided over by a monopolist producer. This result of emergent stability shows that the Bowley duopoly should be considered alongside other oligopoly models.     

The Structure of the Japanese Stock Market

The Japanese stock market is characterized by two prominent features. First, stock prices have been extremely volatile over the past ten years. Second, the market is dominated by cross-shareholdings and stagnant individual stock ownership. So, there are two purposes on this paper. The first is to assess the effects of stock cross-holdings on the stock market. The second is to look at recent stock price fluctuations, in the bubble period before 1990 and during the subsequent collapse. It will be recognized that these two features are interrelated.     

EXPORT SUBSIDIES, COST DIFFERENTIAL AND PRODUCT QUALITY

This paper presents a vertical product differentiation model to examine the relationship between optimal trade policies and product qualities for different export countries under Cournot quantity competition as well as Bertrand price competition. We can also use this quality model to explain why Japan as a high production-cost country may have incentives to offer high subsidies. This is a case that cannot be explained by the strategic trade theory models à la Brander and Spencer (1985) or Eaton and Grossman (1986).     

Agglomeration and competition

This paper presents and examines a simple Weberian model of location under conditions of imperfect competition. Given the number of homogeneous Cournot entrants, conditions are shown under which the firm may move toward the market site or to an input site. Demonstrated also is how output may be increased or decreased correspondingly. In any case, insofar as profit remains to be positive, new entry is kept attracted. The paper shows how in the process locational choice along with output may fluctuate as entry continues over time until a long-run non-negative/minimum profit equilibrium obtains.