Transboundary Pollution and the Welfare Effects of Technology Transfer

We examine the welfare effects of a transfer of pollution abatement technology in a two-country model. In each country, one industry discharges pollution as a byproduct of output, and the sum of domestic and cross-border pollution decreases the productivity of the other industry. We show the effects of technology transfer on the terms of trade, pollution levels, and welfare. Technology transfer decreases the pollution affecting each country under certain conditions. We derive and interpret the conditions under which technology transfer enriches the donor and the recipient. The results essentially depend on the trade pattern and the fraction of cross-border pollution.     

Tied Aid and Welfare

In this paper we present a model of tied aid to shed light on the dispute between Kemp and Kojima (1985 ) and Schweinberger (1990 ) and to complement their analyses. We show that if the households of the recipient country are not informed of the transfers at their consumption decision, they have an incentive to trade the purchased goods from their domestic production income whenever transfer paradoxes occur. We also demonstrate that when they are aware of the transfers and can trade the purchased goods from their production income, there are no transfer paradoxes under the normality condition of commodities.     

Substitution and expansion effects in production theory: The case of joint production

This paper is concerned with a systematic examination of what happens when a firm that has been in equilibrium at certain prices of inputs and prices of outputs experiences a change in these prices. The mutual effects between inputs and between outputs and the cross effects between inputs and outputs are explored by means of various kinds of decomposition equations in production theory. A definition of the “normal” technology is given to show that inputs are not gross substitutes, nor are outputs, and that the input-output relations are not regressive.     

National culture and its impact on the choice of managing director in international production: the case of foreign firms in Greece

The aim of this study is to determine whether attitudinal differences between British and Japanese managers observed in the workplace can be attributed to culture or to the employment system. The findings provided substantial support for attribution to the employment system. Cultural differences between British and Japanese managers were not as large as the cultural thesis claims. The stereotyped cultural characteristics of Japanese managers - high social orientation at work and unconditional priority of work over family - were observed only in limited groups such as managers on the shop floor or senior managers. Attitudinal differences in the workplace were not simply the consequence of cultural differences, but rather to be understood as rational behavioural responses. Both British and Japanese managers' attitudes were considered to be a rational response to their employment systems.     

On the Conditions under which Audit Risk Increases with Information

It has been reported in the literature on strategic auditing that audit risk (the probability of audit failure) may increase when the auditor obtains information, whereas conditions for such cases have not been identified as yet. This paper provides simple models to analyze the general tendencies of exogenous parameters for such cases. The analysis shows that audit risk increases with more information if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive to commit fraud. If the auditee is penalized by auditor rejection even when he does not commit fraud, the detection risk increases with more information. In this case, if the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive to avoid false rejection, audit risk increases with more information.     

Efficiency in International Trade with Firm Heterogeneity and Networks

This paper examines integrated effects of firm heterogeneity and communication network services on international trade. Patterns and effects of trade are analyzed in a general equilibrium model where firms with different productivity levels share among them the cost of network services and compete in a monopolistically competitive market for a differentiated good. The paper reveals that the more efficient country in the production of the differentiated good is not always the net exporter of the good. The less efficient country also has the chance to expand the industry and then to become the net exporter in this intra‐industry trade due to the combination of the efficiency effect induced by firm heterogeneity and the cost‐sharing effect by the existence of the network service industry.     

Standards policy and international trade: Multilateralism versus regionalism

We develop a simple model of policy coordination on domestic standards and examine whether domestic standards policy can lead to regional and multilateral harmonization of standards under the principle of national treatment. This paper focuses on mandatory product and process standards affecting the characteristics of a final good that control negative consumption externalities (e.g., vehicle emissions control and safety standards, restrictions on the use of pesticides for agricultural goods, and safety standards for electrical products). Only the products that meet a country's national standards are allowed to circulate in that country's market. Raising standards reduces negative externalities caused by consumption of a traded good but increases firms’ costs. We use the core as the solution concept. A standards regime is considered to be in the core if it is not blocked by any coalition within countries. The main finding is that a multilateral agreement on standards that maximizes world welfare is only in the core if externalities are local or slightly transboundary. Otherwise, only a regional agreement on standards is in the core. As extensions, we consider many and asymmetric number of firms, asymmetry in market size, fixed costs for different standards, and a multilateral agreement on different standards.