The productive effect of transport infrastructures: does road transport liberalization matter?

In this paper we analyze the impact of motorway networks on production for a panel of twenty one manufacturing and service sectors of eleven EU countries observed over the period 1980–2003. In particular, we analyze if the degree of regulation of the road transport sector affects the link between productivity and motorway infrastructures. Overall results suggest that output elasticity with respect to motorway is found to be lower for countries characterised by a high degree of entry barriers in the road transport sector. This result is found to be more evident for industries which rely more heavily on transport services.     

Interethnic relations,informal trading networks,and social integration: imitation,habits, and social evolution

The ethnically homogeneous middleman groups (EHMGs), which are informal trading networks, are ubiquitous in less-developed economies where the legal infrastructure for contract enforcement is not well developed. This paper develops a formal model of social interaction among members of the EHMG as well as in more general situations in a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society consisting of identifiable ethnic or linguistic groups. Behavioral patterns are transmitted between generations and altered via imitation in social contacts. The model demonstrates how different discriminatory behavioral patterns can evolve and persist over time. One result is that the trust between such groups can increase due to a higher frequency of inter-group contacts. In concluding the paper, we speculate about how the model can be expanded to include changes in legal structures, especially contract law. This could lead to an increase in the trust between the different groups.     

Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?

This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of alternative policy regimes in a closed economy where a central bank, a fiscal authority and a monopoly union interact via their effects on output and inflation. The analysis compares macroeconomic outcomes in a non-cooperative setting, where players may move sequentially or simultaneously, and in a regime of cooperation between the government and wage-setters. The cooperative regime captures a climate of accord among social parties that is finalised at common macroeconomic targets in the tradition of corporatism, as in the recent experience of “social pacts” in many European countries. The paper makes two main contributions. First, it shows that macroeconomic outcomes are suboptimal in the non-cooperative regime and may deliver extreme (undesirable) results even when all players share common ideal targets for output and inflation. All players would be better off with a less extreme value for output or inflation, yet they fail to reach a more advantageous allocation as long as there is an inherent conflict among their further objectives. Moreover, the result is robust to a change in the degree of central bank’s conservatism. Second, I find that cooperation between the government and the monopoly union towards common ideal targets for inflation, output and taxes enhances social welfare even in the absence of explicit coordination with the central bank.     

Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents

We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003). To the memory of Gerard Debreu. A preliminary draft was presented in Paris, in April of 2005. I have benefited from the discussion, comments and questions of Erik Balder, Jean-Marc Bonnisseu, Bernard Cornet and Filipe Martins Da-Rocha and Conny Podczeck. A careful and knowledgeable referee made several useful comments and rescued me from a mishap.     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Bilateral and regional trade elasticities of the EU

The traditional way of assessing the impact of currency depreciation and income on the trade balance has been to estimate the elasticity of trade volume to relative prices and income. The previous studies examine the problems associated with using aggregate data. The recent studies rely on bilateral data, yet another problem is that data for export and import prices are not available. Thus, this study proposes an alternative way of assessing the impact of currency depreciation by using the real exchange rate and the impact of income on bilateral trade. The models are applied between the EU and its major trading partners. Furthermore, the analysis includes the six major trading regions along side the eight major trading countries for 1980–2007, on the quarterly basis. This article uses the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) approach advocated by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). Our results indicate a higher importance of income compared to the real exchange rate in defined bilateral export and import demand functions. In addition, the applied CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests confirm the stability of estimated coefficients in most cases.     

Sustainable Development and a Dwindling Carbon Space

Curbing global warming by setting long term maxima for temperature rise or concentrations of greenhouse gases defines spaces within which further emissions of these gases are to remain (referred to here as ‘carbon spaces’). This paper addresses questions related to how to share between countries the carbon space and/or efforts to stay within it, in the perspective of sustainable development; different allocation mechanisms are reviewed, responding to criteria such as ‘responsibility’ for climate change, ‘capability’ to engage in abating it, and ‘potential’ or future contribution. The carbon space remaining at any time will depend on effective mitigation up till that time, and will condense if more stringent maxima are to be set; per capita this space becomes smaller with rising population. Sharing the carbon space in a fair way requires “convergence” of currently widely unequal per capita emissions. If the world is to stay within the carbon space consistent with <2° warming, then developed economies—the wealthiest sources of greenhouse gases should quickly and deeply engage in mitigation. Also, substantial mitigation is to take place in developing countries and that this will require substantial support to developing countries (financially, technologically). Changing development paths can make a major contribution to climate change mitigation; this requires changes in investment, production and consumption patterns. Green New Deals as proposed in the context of a widened response to the current economic crisis could become a first phase of a fundamental transition towards a decarbonised global economy worldwide. Concerns to do with equity as well as sustainability must be incorporated and integrated into coherent transitory strategies.     

Technological knowledge as an essential facility

The economics of regulation has articulated the notions of essential facility and mandated interconnection. Their application to the governance of technological knowledge can be fruitful especially when implemented by the adoption of a compensatory liability rule and the parallel reduction in the exclusivity of patents. Because knowledge is at the same time an output and an input in the production of new knowledge, exclusivity, traditionally associated to patents, is the cause of actual knowledge rationing with major drawbacks in terms of both static and dynamic efficiency. This institutional innovation can improve the governance of technological knowledge and increase both its rates of dissemination and generation.

Mixed up? that’s good for motivation

We show that career concerns can arise in the absence of ex ante uncertainty about an agent’s type, if his unobservable actions influence future productivity. Implementing effort in mixed strategies allows the principal to endogenously introduce uncertainty about the agent’s ex post productivity and generate reputational incentives. Creating such ambiguity can be optimal for the principal, even though this exposes the agent to additional risk and reduces output. This finding for an environment with imperfect commitment contrasts with standard agency models, where implementing mixed strategy actions typically is not optimal if pure strategies can also be implemented.