Emerging markets, evolving institutions, and the new opportunities for growth in China's rural economy

In this essay, our goal is to assess the state of China's rural economy and examine whether rural China is capable of participating in the sequence of economic events that will lead to modernization. We examine how agricultural productivity has changed, the nature of the shift of labor moving from rural to urban areas, how commodity markets have evolved, and how the rural industrial sector is adjusting the recent reforms. According to our own work and that of others, we show how the rural economy is beginning to be fundamentally transformed and is contributing to China's modernization.     

对排列调车短进路的新解

针对电气集中操作手册中“长短进路”定义,结合工作实践及对事故的调查研究,提出以是否达到调车目的地为界标来重新规定“短进路”、“长进路”概念,为“禁止排列短进路调车”纳入规章提供了理论基础,并建议排列调车“短进路”时应采取调车书面计划再辅以口头修正计划方式,以保证铁路作业安全,提高运输效率。     

中国—东盟自贸区建设与南宁会展业发展关系模型

本文在分析城市会展业发展必备条件的基础上，论述了中国-东盟自由贸易区建设与南宁会展业发展之间的关系，并构建了两者的关系模型，进而提出了南宁会展业发展必须关注的问题及相应对策。     

我国财政支农的资金效益问题研究

本文通过一系列数据对我国财政支农资金的效益进行分析得出农村居民纯收入的缓慢增长与财政支农资金的快速增加形成了明显反差,我国财政支农资金使用效益不高。针对这样的现状,分析了产生财政支农资金效益不足的原因,并提出相应措施来提高财政支农资金的使用效益。     

基于AHP＋熵组合的相对发达地区新乡镇建设评价——以苏南三镇为例

面对新农村建设活跃和城市化进程加速，新乡镇建设也初见端倪，选取苏南三镇作为实证地点，构建相对发达地区新乡镇建设评价体系，利用主观赋权的层次分析法（AHP）和客观赋权的熵权法进行组合评价。     

基于模糊综合评价的职业经理人力资本价值评估模型

文章在分析我国职业经理人力资本价值评估研究现状的基础上,以职业经理激励约束为导向,建立了职业经理综合素质测评体系,构建了职业经理人力资本价值评估模型,最后结合实例验证了模型的有效性。     

国库集中支付操作风险产生机理的博弈分析

国库集中支付操作风险是指国库资金支付过程中出现违规操作行为的可能性。国库集中支付制度框架下财政资金支付活动是财政部门、预算单位、代理银行和人民银行共同参与的博弈过程。本文运用博弈理论首先分析国库集中支付操作风险产生的内在机理，然后剖析国库集中支付操作风险产生的外在博弈条件，最后从优化博弈条件出发，提出建立健全监督激励机制以防范国库集中支付操作风险的建议。     

Research on principal-agency of stockholders and managers under asymmetric information condition

In modem enterprises, a separation of the right of ownership and management results in asymmetric information problems between stockholders and managers. In conditions of principal-agency relationship, the game behaviors between principle and agency within enterprises are impacted by asymmetric information. This study discusses the game behaviors between stockholders and managers by using information economic theories from the perspective of asymmetric information. Based on the model of the principal-agency relationship between stockholders and managers, our research uses quantitative analysis to reveal how to achieve maximum profit expected of stockholders through an incomplete contract, under asymmetric information condition.