论市场的上层组织及其功能

论文认为市场的上层组织的建立既是成熟市场经济体制的标志,也是发展中国家和转型国家市场化进程中的一个"坎".市场上层组织具有生产性、风险转移和前瞻性三大功能,而有效率的产权制度和法治化社会是建立市场上层组织的两个基本条件.     

Spontaneous visualization and concept evaluation

This paper proposes that customers often respond to brand extension concepts by visualizing the product. We call this process spontaneous visualization and suggest that it precedes concept evaluations. In two studies, we show that spontaneous visualization is enhanced by the fit between the parent brand and the extension category and by the ease with which the product category can be imagined. The appeal of the visualized image in turn determines whether visualization enhances or decreases concept evaluations. In addition, we find a stronger link between product evaluations and delayed choice when evaluations are based on visualization; evaluations based on visualization hence appear to be more “valid” in the sense of predicting subsequent behavior. Implications of these findings and ideas for future research are discussed.

Prototypicality advantages for pioneers over me-too brands: the role of evolving product designs

Prior empirical research suggests that consumers perceive pioneers as more prototypical (i.e., representative) of their product categories than me-too followers. This prototypicality advantage is believed to contribute to an enduring marketplace advantage for the pioneer. We extend research into pioneering prototypicality advantages by considering the ramifications of simultaneous product design (i.e., product attribute) evolutions. We hypothesize that the simultaneous evolution of product designs of both the pioneer and me-too will diminish the pioneer’s prototypicality advantage over the me-too, even though the me-too does not initiate the change. To test our hypotheses, we create an experimental environment consisting of four cells, each corresponding to a different marketplace scenario: a no-change condition; a simultaneous-evolution condition; a pioneer-updates-first condition; and a leapfrogging (i.e., me-too updates first) condition. The results suggest that simultaneous design evolutions can diminish the pioneer’s prototypicality advantage. As a result, me-too entry may be a more attractive strategy in the long-run than currently believed in product categories characterized by substantial design evolution.

Managerial,organizational, and external drivers of sales effectiveness in export market ventures

The authors extend sales management theory by considering the role of export sales management in small- and medium-sized firms, and they develop an integrated model of export sales organization effectiveness. Specifically, the authors test 16 hypotheses that examine the relationships among export sales management control, export territory, psychic distance, export sales performance, and export sales organization effectiveness. Using a mail-survey approach, data were collected from U.K.-based export sales managers in 146 direct exporters of industrial products. Though certain anomalies are observed, the research findings support many of the hypothesized associations, confirming the robustness of existing sales management concepts and theories in an export-marketing context.

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Intentions to Report Questionable Acts: An Examination of the Influence of Anonymous Reporting Channel,Internal Audit Quality,and Setting

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires audit committees of public companies’ boards of directors to install an anonymous reporting channel to assist in deterring and detecting accounting fraud and control weaknesses. While it is generally accepted that the availability of such a reporting channel may reduce the reporting cost of the observer of a questionable act, there is concern that the addition of such a channel may decrease the overall effectiveness compared to a system employing only non-anonymous reporting options. The rationale underlying this concern involves the would-be reporter’s likelihood of reporting, the seriousness with which the organization treats an anonymous report, and the organization’s ability to thoroughly follow-up the report. Thus, we explore the extent to which the availability of an anonymous reporting channel influences intended use of non-anonymous reporting channels. Further, in response to Sarbanes–Oxley and the environment of financial scandals that led to its passage, many firms are strengthening their internal audit departments, and providing them with greater independence from upper management’s direct control. Accordingly, our examination tests whether the intended use of the internal audit department as an internal reporting channel is greater when the internal audit department is of “high” versus “low” quality. Finally, the study investigates intended reporting behavior across three different cases (e.g., settings). Results show that the existence of an anonymous channel does reduce the likelihood of reporting to non-anonymous channels, that generally the internal audit department quality does not affect reporting to non-anonymous channels, and that case-setting affects the type of channel to be used. Implications from the study are discussed.     

The "New" Stability and Growth Pact: More Flexible,Less Stupid?

The doubts and criticisms with regard to the fiscal discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have been many and varied, and the SGP was revised as a result. The following paper evaluates the changes contained in the "new" SGP by considering the properties for ideal fiscal rules put forward by Kopits and Symansky. The analysis points towards a clear increase in flexibility together with the probable emergence of new enforcement problems. In this context, the need for new improvements within the European framework for the definition and implementation of national fiscal policies is discussed.     

Keeping Public Institutions Invested in Tobacco

Increasingly through the 1990s, tobacco control advocates questioned the practice of public institutions investing in tobacco company stocks. The questioning was framed in at least three ways. First, is it ethical to fund public expenditures with profits from a product that causes addiction and disease? Second, is it sound social policy to derive public income from a product that increases healthcare costs and reduces worker productivity? Finally, is it sound fiscal policy to invest in an historically profitable industry facing multiplying legal and regulatory challenges? While the tobacco industry preferred to restrict discussion to the fiscal question, and offered an affirmative answer, its position was weakened by depressed stock prices brought on by actions of the industry as much as by tobacco control activism. As part of a campaign to restore its credibility as an investment vehicle with public fund managers, Philip Morris (PM) commissioned a report from the influential investment managers/advisors Wilshire Associates. However, Wilshire had only recently conducted such a study for the Washington State Investment Board (WSIB), assuring the board that the value tobacco stocks added to an investment portfolio – if any – was too small to be measured. Nonetheless, within a year, Wilshire produced a report for PM which appeared to laud the investment value of tobacco and to dismiss tobacco-excluded investment alternatives. This paper examines how Wilshire produced apparently diametrically opposed reports for clients with different interests. It reveals a pattern of potential conflicts of interest among tobacco companies, financial analysis firms, investment authorities, and institutional fund managers. It demonstrates substantial violations of two generally accepted ethical principles of business consulting: veracity and transparency.     

Bridging Business and Society: The Abrinq Foundation in Brazil

This article presents the process of creation and expansion of the Fundação Abrinq pelos Direitos da Criança et do Adolescente (Abrinq Foundation for Rights of Children and Adolescents). Established in 1990 by a group of entrepreneurs from the Brazilian Toy Manufacturers’ Association (ABRINQ), the Fundação Abrinq has been successful at raising the issue of children in Brazilian society by bridging business and several other sectors of society. This article more particularly examines (1) the societal challenges related to the situation of children in Brazil; (2) the creation and development of the Abrinq Foundation; and (3) the achievements of this innovative bridging organization over 15 years.     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.