Do Individual Preferences Affect the Environmental Decision‐Making Process in Teams? The Role of Participation

Literature on organizations and the natural environment has focused on the importance of individual managers and leaders. However, this literature has scarcely ever focused on individuals in the team context, even when teams have been considered to be key for a firms’ environmental progress. Although teams’ environmental decisions can be enriched by the different contributions of team members, it is necessary that team members actually participate and contribute their preferences during the decision‐making process. We used an adaptation of the legislative dilemma task with 84 students to contribute to environmental management literature by analyzing members’ participation during the team decision‐making process. The results of this paper show how those members with environmentally proactive preferences have a higher participation during the decision‐making process, and as a consequence they have a greater influence on the team decision. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

A non-parametric independence test using permutation entropy

In the present paper we construct a new, simple, consistent and powerful test for independence by using symbolic dynamics and permutation entropy as a measure of serial dependence. We also give a standard asymptotic distribution of an affine transformation of the permutation entropy under the null hypothesis of independence. The test statistic and its standard limit distribution are invariant to any monotonic transformation. The test applies to time series with discrete or continuous distributions. Eventhough the test is based on entropy measures, it avoids smoothed non-parametric estimation. An application to several daily financial time series illustrates our approach.     

Real Options Valuation: A Case Study of an E‐commerce Company

This paper presents a real options valuation model with original solutions to some issues that arise frequently when trying to apply these models to real‐life situations. The authors build on existing models by introducing an innovative and intuitive risk neutral adjustment that allows us to work with all the simulated paths. The problem of incorporating real options into each path is solved with a “nearest neighbors” technique, and uncertainty is simulated using a beta distribution that adapts better to company‐specific information. The model is then applied to a real life e‐commerce company to produce the following insights: the expanded present value is higher than the traditional present value; the presence of several real options make them interact so that their values are nonadditive; and part of the expanded present value is explained by the presence of “Jensen's inequality” that stems from the “convexity” between the value of each year's cash flow and the uncertain variables.     

Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

In this paper, we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where consumption of both goods is positive for all agents. For the case of two or more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality. We are very grateful to Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Carmen Beviá, Xavier Calsamiglia, Marco Celentani, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Romero-Medina, William Thomson, Walter Trockel, an associate editor, three anonymous referees and participants at seminars at Universities of Alicante, Autónoma de Barcelona and Rochester and the Spanish Economic Association meeting in Sevilla for very helpful comments and suggestions.     

A note on the “size” of determinacy and indeterminacy

Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative statics exercises. Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997     

Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value. Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997