Circuit Breakers with Uncertainty about the Presence of Informed Agents: I Know What You Know … I Think

This study conducts experimental asset markets to examine the effects of circuit breaker rules on market behavior when agents are uncertain about the presence of private information. Our results unequivocally indicate that circuit breakers fail to temper unwarranted price movements in periods without private information. Agents appear to mistakenly infer that others possess private information, causing price to move away from fundamental value. Allocative efficiencies in our markets are high across all regimes. Circuit breakers perform no useful function in our experimental asset markets.     

Financial Supervision: Integrated or Specialized?The case of Latin America and the Caribbean

This paper discusses the relative merits of the two approaches of financial regulation and supervision for the case of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In doing so, it reviews the main arguments advanced in the specialized literature in pro and against of each approach. All the theoretical arguments are contrasted with available country experiences from around the world and discussed with a focus on the Latin American and Caribbean countries. A methodology to analyze the efficacy and the efficiency of each approach in meeting the main objectives of financial regulation is also provided. The paper concludes that in the present circumstances, the net benefits of adopting an integrated approach probably exceed the net benefits stemming from the adoption of a specialized approach for most of the countries in the region.     

Organizational Culture, Individual Differences and the Participation System in Cooperativism of Associated Workers in Andalusia, Spain

From a psychosocial perspective, we have attempted to identify the characteristics of the democratic systems of a sample of 36 Andalusian cooperatives of associated workers. In this study it has become evident that those who participate the least in the governments of their organizations are the workers and those with less education. Thus, there is a high degree of association between participation in the governing of the cooperative and the development within it of an appropriate organizational culture. The results of this study have allowed us to empirically deconstruct the concept of cooperative democracy, and this process may have an effect on the improvement of human resource administration in this type of organization.     

Implementation of Basel II

In this article Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, first discusses the current status of the Basel II Accord. Next, he offers his perspective on macroeconomic issues related to the capital framework, focusing especially on pro‐cyclicality. Finally, he discusses three important Basel II implementation issues, namely calibration, validation, and cross‐border supervision.     

Countercyclical Capital and Currency Dependence

The introduction of risk sensitive bank capital charges into currency dependent economies exasperates the inherent procyclicality of banking regulations and frustrates the conduct of monetary policy. The authors argue that, by requiring capital charges resulting from foreign currency lending to be denominated in the same foreign currency, the capital charge becomes countercyclical.     

Imposing Capital Controls on Credit Unions: An Analysis of Regulatory Intervention in Australia

Abstract ** ** Résumé en fin d’article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.
: What impacts would minimum capital requirements have on mutual institutions lacking the ability to raise equity capital? Can the response of credit unions to capital controls be explained by internal member bonding? The imposition of capital controls on credit unions by the Australian Financial Institutions Commission is studied as a Box‐Tiao time series quasi‐experiment. Time series intervention and trend analyses are performed on a sample of 150 credit unions over the period 1987 to 1997, together with cross‐sectional regressions of the estimated responses. The results demonstrate that the capital controls had a significant impact on credit union behavior. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the response of individual credit unions is found to be a function of initial capital levels and internal member bonding.     

Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22

Despite the long experience in the U.S. with restructuring companies in bankruptcy, there remains a persistent tendency for companies to emerge from Chapter 11 with too much debt and too little profitability. In this article, the author uses a variant of his well-known "Z-Score" bankruptcy prediction model to assess the future viability of companies when emerging from bankruptcy, including the likelihood that they will file again—a surprisingly common phenomenon that is now referred to as "Chapter 22."
The author reports that those companies that filed second bankruptcy petitions were both significantly less profitable and more highly leveraged than those that emerged and continued as going concerns. Indeed, the average financial profile and bond rating equivalent for the "Chapter 22" companies on emerging from their first bankruptcies were not much better than those of companies in default.
The authors findings also suggest that a credible corporate distress prediction model could be used as an independent, unbiased method for assessing the future viability of proposed reorganization plans. Another potential application of the model is by the creditors of the "old" company when assessing the investment value of the new package of securities, including new equity, offered in the plan.     

Does Board Independence Matter in Companies with a Controlling Shareholder?

A number of studies have reported value discounts for listed companies in countries that provide weak legal protection to minority shareholders. Such studies typically attribute these discounts to the ability, and the well‐documented tendency, of controlling shareholders to extract a disproportionate share of corporate resources for “private benefits.” This tendency and the resulting discounts create a dilemma for those controlling shareholders intent on maximizing value for not just themselves, but all shareholders: How can such controlling shareholders assure their minority shareholders that they will not exploit their power to expropriate resources and so eliminate the discount from their companies' shares? This article investigates the possibility that such discounts can be reduced by appointing boards of directors made up of individuals who are independent of the controlling shareholders. Based on the systematic analysis of some 800 companies representing 22 countries, the authors' recent study reports that corporate values are consistently higher when boards are more independent of controlling shareholders—and that this relationship is especially strong in those countries that afford fewer rights to minority shareholders. What is likely to cause controlling shareholders to appoint more independent directors—a change that, after all, effectively limits the controlling shareholders' power and “degrees of freedom”? The answer provided by the authors is that board independence is most likely to be pursued by companies with controlling shareholders that also have major growth opportunities that must be funded mainly with outside equity.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.