Innovators, Organization Structure and Management of the Innovation Process in the Securities Industry

This article examines innovation in the securities industry with the central objective of identifying factors that separate innovators from non-innovators. Akira Iwamura and Vijay Jog report results based on their survey of corporate finance vice presidents or CEO's of 43 investment houses from around the world. They conclude that innovative companies seem to be larger and have a well-defined strategy, with management defining the focus of the business. In addition, the firms have developed better communication channels, both internally and with their customers. Yet, the most significant difference that separates innovators from non-innovators is their management of the idea generation process, including concept generation and management's support. Innovators tend to approach idea generation in the following ways: they employ a variety of idea sources, both internal and external; they assign a specific person or group to be in charge of developing new ideas; they encourage employees at all levels to generate new ideas; they use a variety of innovative techniques to stimulate creativity; they reward their employees by non-monetary means; and they encourage group-level participation in evaluation decisions.     

Health Status Risks and the Efficiency of Social Security Systems

We studied the allocative efficiency of a social security system with earning tests focusing on the leisure–work choices of older men. Given empirical findings that health status and social security benefits are the most important determinants of such choices, we incorporated risks with respect to health status into an overlapping–generations model, and analysed how allocative efficiency was changed by the introduction of social security systems. It was found that the effects of a social security system can be broken down into particular categories and that a social security system improves efficiency when the pension system is small. JEL Classification Numbers: H55, I10, E40.     

Explaining Growth: A Contest Between Models

Recent contributions to the empirical growth literature show no tendency to convergence in specification, as researchers seek to identify new variables that can account for significant regional effects in earlier work. We conduct non-nested tests between the models of Barro (1997), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Sachs and Warner (1997). The data strongly prefer an encompassing model, but fail to reject any of the candidate models, implying that each model represents a partial truth. We identify a model that includes most (but not all) of the regressors in the candidate models and is robust to the inclusion of regional dummies.     

School Education,Learning‐by‐Doing,and Fertility in Economic Development

We examine the policy implications of relaxing constraints on the educational choice of individuals for economic development. Distinguishing human capital accumulation through schooling and through learning‐by‐doing and knowledge spillovers, we show that in the earlier stages of development, mitigating and eventually eliminating constraints on school education would be necessary for even further economic development. Expanded school education increases the income of individuals and encourages physical capital accumulation, which enlarges productive knowledge through implementation and operations. The increased labor productivity thus boosts economic growth. In the process, the fertility rate will decline because of the increased education cost per child.     

Discovery,invention and serendipity

This paper attempts to relate serendipity, the natural ability to make interesting or valuable discoveries by accident （Longman Discovery of Contemporary English） with notable discoveries and inventions. It connotes the profound ability of finding out valuable things different from those who have been exploring by spending a lot of time or for years. The author will illustrate as many cases as possible within a given time constraint, so that surrounding environments and situations may be clarified, and such discoveries and inventions may be plausibly accomplished by accident or with rich reasons. These illustrations include historical as well as more recent cases. One of the cases is beyond the scope of our environment on the earth with preconceived notion, while other cases have given great impacts to our politics and also military intelligence. It should be noted that business and technological intelligence are deeply connected with discoveries, inventions and serendipity. In concluding remarks, the essence of serendipity will be summarized and how to side with the serendipity at the most important moment will be examined by viewing time series endeavors of the inventors and those who have devoted much time to discoveries.     

Who has benefited from the health services system for the elderly in Japan?

This paper examines the demand and supply of medical services for the elderly in the health services system characterized by per-month fixed copayment and selective capitation fee scheme for outpatients with chronic diseases. The results indicate that the beneficiary, in particular the household dependent, visits a physician more frequently because the actual copayment decreases for the household dependent, but is nearly the same for the head of the household. Physicians, however, provide more services to the beneficiary partly because of the lowered copayment and partly because of the capitation fee scheme, which they will select instead of the fee-for-service scheme only when capitation is more profitable than Fee-for-Service. As a result, physicians as well as the insured benefit from the health services system.     

Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note

We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.