Employment and Prices in a Simple Macroeconomy

This exercise sets up interlinked labor and goods markets in a classroom macroeconomy. Students with worker roles are endowed with labor that can be consumed or sold to firms that post wages, purchase labor, and produce goods that can be either consumed or sold to workers. The money from sales is used by firms to purchase labor in the next period. Complicated record keeping is avoided by using ordinary playing cards to represent money and goods. The exercise can stimulate a discussion of potential output, unemployment, and the role of money in determining wages and prices. Use: This experiment can be used in introductory macroeconomics classes to teach concepts of the circular flow, real and money wages, unemployment, and labor market equilibrium and in intermediate classes to consider Keynesian and quantity theories. Time required: Fifteen minutes for reading instructions, 30 to 45 minutes for trading (depending on the number of periods), and 15 minutes for discussion. Materials: You will need one copy of the instructions for each person and one deck of ordinary playing cards for each replicated group of two workers and one firm. No money or other incentives are required.     

Conspiracies and Secret Discounts in Laboratory Markets

This paper uses laboratory methods to evaluate whether price-fixing conspiracies break down in the presence of opportunities to offer secret discounts. The primary treatment difference is whether or not buyer-specific discounts from the posted list price are permitted. In standard posted-offer markets, conspiring sellers almost uniformly find and maintain near-monopoly prices. But when the possibility of offering secret discounts is introd uced, sellers find sustaining collusive agreements much more difficult, and transactions prices tend to fall toward competitive levels. Secret discounts yield competitive outcomes less consistently, however, when sellers are provided ex post information about sales quantities     

What becomes an icon most?

Some brands become icons. Think of Nike, Apple, Harley-Davidson: They're the brands every marketer regards with awe. But they are not built according to the principles of conventional marketing, says Harvard Business School marketing professor Douglas Holt. Iconic brands beat the competition not just by delivering innovative benefits, services, or technologies but by forging a deep connection with the culture. A brand becomes an icon when it offers a compelling myth, a story that can help people resolve tensions in their lives. The deepest source of tension in modern society is the disparity between national ideology and the average citizen's reality. When ideologies shift, myths become even more important, and in America, the most potent myths are depictions of rebels. Mountain Dew has long offered a rebel myth in ads showing exciting, vital men who are far from the ideological model of success. Loyal customers drink the beverage to consume the myth. But Mountain Dew's greatest achievement is that it has retained its iconic power by creating fresh rebel myths to suit the tensions of each era: first the hillbilly, who stood in stark contrast to the organization man of the 1950s and 1960s; then the redneck, who rebelled against the investment bankers and consultants of the 1970s and 1980s; and most recently the slacker, who rejects the values and behaviors that, for the past decade, have marked the successful executive. Holt says marketers can learn from Mountain Dew and other iconic brands if they are willing to move beyond conventional brand management and acquire knowledge and skills they may not have. They must learn to target national contradictions instead of just consumer segments, create myths that make sense of confusing societal changes, and speak with a rebel's voice.     

On the use of profit data to estimate the social cost of monopoly power in an oligopoly

Relatively high estimates of the welfare cost of monopoly power in U.S. manufacturing industries have been obtained by economists who use the Lerner equation to estimate this welfare cost from profit data. These Lerner equation loss estimates are appropriate for a monopoly with constant costs and linear demand. But if the industry is an oligopoly in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, the Lerner equation loss estimates can be more than twice as large as the actual welfare gain that would result from the elimination of monopoly power. Partial and general equilibrium examples are presented to illustrate the nature of these estimation errors.     

When Philosophy and Business Professors Talk: Assessment of Ethical Reasoning in a Cross Disciplinary Business Ethics Course

Can instructors with apparently divergent approaches to the goals and methods of teaching business ethics agree upon a core set of course objectives? Can they agree upon a common method of assessment for measuring student performance against shared standards? This paper reports the results of a project intended to address these questions. The goals of the project were threefold: (1) to identify a shared set of core competencies for all students in business ethics; (2) to adopt a common assessment of ethical reasoning (neutral to disciplinary bias) for measuring student performance in core competencies; (3) to determine whether students show improvement in core competencies over the course of a semester. Our findings suggest that it is possible to find common ground in measurable objectives and to expect instructors to interpret, apply, and teach to these objectives effectively without infringing upon their disciplinary differences.     

Supply Dynamics in the U.S. Hog Industry

A variety of methods and empirical techniques are now available for estimating dynamic economic relationships. Unfortunately, most dynamic modeling procedures rely heavily on the sample data for specification. This is due to a lack of a priori information useful for determining the appropriate lag structure. However, there is frequently a rich source of information that can be used to define lag structures in agricultural supply models. This information is related to the biological and physiological processes characterizing agricultural production. In this paper, a quarterly econometric model of supply response in the U.S. hog industry is specified and estimated. This model incorporates relevant biological features of hog production directly into the specification. The structural integrity of the model is evaluated by examining post-sample predictive ability and mean-path elasticities. The results indicate performance that is consistent with observed behavior in the U.S. hog industry. Nous disposons aujourd'hui de toute une gamme de méthodes et de techniques empiriques pour ?estimation des rapports économiques dynamiques. Malheureusement, la plupart des méthodes de modélisation dynamique dépendent étroitement, pour leurs spécifications, sur des données échantillonnées. Ceci découle ?un manque ?informations a priori utiles pour la détermination de la structure de retard appropriée. Toutefois, on dispose fréquemment ?une riche source ?informations qui peuvent servir à définir les structures de retard dans les modèles de ?offre en agriculture. Cette information est liée aux processus biologiques et physiologiques caractérisant la production agricole. Dans le présent document, nous procédons à la spécification et à ?estimation ?un modèle économétrique trimestriel du comportement de ?offre dans le secteur américain du pore. Ce modèle incorpore directement dans la spécification les caractéristiques biologiques pertinentes de la production porcine. Nous évaluons ?intégrité structurale du modèle en examinant ?aptitude prédictive post-échantillonnage et les valeurs moyennes ?élasticité. Nos résultats laissent conclure à une performance qui vient corroborer le comportement observé dans le secteur américain du porc.     

Quasi‐rational and ex ante price expectations in commodity supply models: an empirical analysis of the US broiler market

A statistically optimal inference about agents' ex ante price expectations within the US broiler market is derived using futures prices of related commodities along with a quasi‐rational forecasting regression equation. The modelling approach, which builds on a Hamilton‐type framework, includes endogenous production and allows expected cash price to be decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated components. We therefore infer the relative importance of various informational sources in expectation formation. Results show that, in addition to the quasi‐rational forecast, the true supply shock, future prices, and ex post commodity price forecast errors have, at times, been influential in broiler producers' price expectations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price rigidities and institutional variations in markets with posted prices

Summary Standard laboratory posted-offer markets respond slowly and incompletely to demand shocks. In these one-sided markets, where sellers control the setting of prices, very little information is transmitted via the process of exchange. For this reason, traders have trouble distinguishing randomness in their own experience from changes in market fundamentals. This paper reports the results of twelve laboratory markets conducted to assess whether some common variants to standard posted-offer rules can correct the adjustment deficiences. Although discounting, multiple postings and excess demand information all improve performance, we find that response remains poor, and efficiencies low.Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9319842 and SBR 9320044), and the University of Virginia Bankard Fund. Data are archived at FTP address: fido.econlab.arizona.edu. We wish to thank Charles Plott and Shyam Sunder for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.