ACTION,AGENCIES, ADVOCACY,AND ANALYSTS1

Generally speaking, human beings dislike admitting flaws in their actions. The complexities of regional development provide ample opportunity for flawed action. As public intervention in the process of economic and social development is on the upswing, serious attention must be paid to evaluations in order to minimize flaws in the programs. This paper examines three constraints to evaluation: friction generated by data collection; absence of precise goals and modus operandi coupled with continuous program modification; and role conflict within the evaluation team. The difficulties with data lie in the definition of regional boundaries and hostility of the people resulting from normlessness and government involvement. Regional survey research centers are suggested to mitigate the problem. The second conistraint exists because of the sensitivity of program administrators to critical evaluation. They react with vague, general, and illusory goals, discounting and negation of results, and the concept of a pilot study from which “lessons learned always justify a program.” Long-run conditioning and public relations may be the only effective policies to relieve this constraint. The third constraint of role conflict has always existed but is particularly important when changes in programs derive from their evaluations. The solution is for our professions to insist on full public disclosure of results coupled with triyearly turnover of evaluation personnel. De façon générale, les humains détestent avouer leurs fautes. he dévelop-peraent régional étant trés complexe, beaucoup ?actions enterprises pourront s'avérer défectueuses ou néfastes. intervention publique dans le processus de développement économique et social se faisant peu fréqtiente, une attention spéciale et constante doit être apportée aux évaluations visant. à minimiser les erreurs dans les programmes. Cet article eiamine trois contraintes propres à?évaluation: obstacles crées par la cueilette des données; absence de buts prés et de modus operandi joints à une modification continuelle du programme; et conflit de rôle dans ?équipe ?évaluation. Les difficultés avec les données sont liées à la délimitation des régions et à?hostilityé des gens résultant de ?absence compléte de normes et de ?ingérence gouvernementale dans la vie privée. Pour résoudre le probléme, on suggére des centres ?enquétes et de recherches régionaux. La seconde contrainte vient du fait que les administrateurs de programme sont sensibles à une évaluation critique. lis répondent avec des buts vagues, généraux et illusoires; Us ne nient pas les résultats mais n'acceptent pas le concept ?une étude pilote óu “Les resultats obtenus justifient toujours un plan ?amélioration.” Un conditionnement à long terme et des relations extérienres peuvent être les settles politiques efficaces pour parer à cette contrainte. La troisiéme, due au conflit de rôle, a toujours existé mais elle est particu-liérement importante quand les modifications de programme dérivent de leurs évaluations. La solution serait que les associations professionnelles insistent sur une divulgation compléte des réstultats au public ainsi qu'un renouueUement du personnel ?évaluation tous les trois ans.     

Qualitätserwartungen und ethischer Anspruch bei der Lektüre von Blogs und von Tageszeitungen

Besides classical journalistic products, media users increasingly tend to read texts on the internet published by other users, as in weblogs. How do users navigate among these offers, how do they evaluate the quality, and which standards in terms of media ethics do they apply when reading weblogs compared to newspaper articles? Two empirical studies address these questions. In a survey, 702 internet users rated their theoretical expectations in terms of journalistic quality and compliance with ethical standards, comparing weblogs and daily newspapers. In a consecutive 2 × 2 experimental design, 120 participants read a journalistic text with varying source information (weblog/daily newspaper) and varying degree of adherence to ethical standards (ethically questionable/neutral). Participants then rated the quality of the text and its ethical standards. Results indicate that daily newspapers more than blogs are expected to deliver journalistic quality. But when read, texts are evaluated according to their content rather than their source. Ethically questionable texts in newspapers are disapproved as much as ethically questionable blog postings.     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Estimating switching costs after introducing Fixed-Mobile Convergence in Japan

In this study, based on a conjoint-type survey analysis, the switching cost of several Japanese telecom services are empirically examined simultaneously, contingent on each carrier’s bundling strategies. The results suggest the following conclusions. The hierarchy of switching costs is mobile phone service, fixed phone service, ISP (Internet Service Provider), and broadband access service, in descending order. Even if the government prohibits the formerly state-owned monopoly NTT from forming alliances with other carriers, the legacy NTT group would still command more than half of the market share under FMC if each carrier adopts a pure bundling strategy. If mixed bundling emerges as the primary strategy in the FMC market, the resulting type of competition from the introduction of FMC does not stimulate competitive pricing.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

External bargaining versus internal manipulation: A theory of managerial delegation

Does the competition mode influence the delegation decisions of the firm owners? By constructing a vertical negotiation game model, we find that under Cournot competition in the downstream market, the downstream firm's owner will not choose delegation, whereas under Bertrand competition, the downstream firm's owner will choose delegation. If the product substitution is relatively large, the adoption of delegation management by the owners of downstream firms under Bertrand competition will bring higher profits. It further shows that compared with the situation of no delegation, delegation management may reverse the social welfare ranking under Bertrand and Cournot competitions.     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.     

Middle Ground: Uniting City,Farm, and Nature with Diverse Agroecosystems

Farming, including family farming, is now dominated by vertically controlled operations that deplete the soil, pollute water, and produce food designed more to satisfy marketing requirements than human nutritional needs. Agricultural practices today are a result of abdicating control over our lives to a thoroughly industrialized culture, in which institutions are governed by the single criterion of efficiency‐‐finding least‐cost solutions. Standardization is a major part of that process. But living systems cannot be standardized. They require diversity and some degree of redundancy to adapt to changing environmental conditions. In the cultural contest between the machine and the garden, the machine has definitely won, but if we do not make room for the garden again, our victory will be our own funeral. New Agrarianism seeks to encourage diversity of species on each farm and across farms within entire landscapes. But farmers cannot carry out the restoration of ecologically‐oriented agriculture on their own. They need support from cities: 1) in the form of markets to sell locally‐grown produce at prices that will support their work, 2) in a new understanding of ecosystems that focuses on inhabited spaces and not just wilderness, and 3) in an orientation that questions whether efficiency should be the paramount value of our culture. Finally, the transition to more biologically‐diverse human settlements can come about only if economic incentives are modified to remove the unrelenting pressure on farmers to expand their operations or go out of business.