Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion

This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.     

Factores determinantes de la lealtad al proveedor de servicios turísticos online

The aim of this study is to analyze the factors determining loyalty towards online tourist services supplier with a model which integrates the influence of trust in tourism websites with the conceptual framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 305 airline travel tickets online purchasers, with the use of structural equation models. The results of the empirical study suggest that the three variables of TPB (perceived control, subjective norm and attitude) positively influence loyalty towards Internet use to purchase airline tickets. The role of trust is especially relevant as it also boosts the effect of TPB variables. Finally, a set of managerial implications are considered.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ON THE “PRO‐POORNESS” OF GROWTH IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTEXT

This paper represents a first attempt to bring together the issues of multidimensional poverty and growth “pro‐poorness” assessments. More specifically, we suggest the use of sequential dominance procedures to test the “pro‐poorness” of observed growth spells when poverty is measured on the basis of income and another discrete well‐being attribute. Sequential procedures are also used to obtain graphical tools that are consistent with the spirit of Ravallion and Chen's growth incidence curve and Son's poverty growth curve. Contrary to traditional unidimensional tests, our method makes it possible to take into account the importance of deprivation correlations at the individual level and thus may reverse results observed with the traditional tools used to check the “pro‐poorness” of growth. An illustration of our approach is given using Turkish data for the period 2003–05.     

INTERSECTORAL ALLIANCE AND SOCIAL INNOVATION: WHEN CORPORATIONS MEET CIVIL SOCIETY

ABSTRACT: This article analyses an alliance between a public utility company and a consortium of Associations upholding consumer rights. The project consists of developing means in order to help customers with very low income in a collection situation by suggesting payment arrangements that would take account of their financial situation. Inter‐organizational collaboration is a way to increase the capacities of organizations and to apply leverage to existing resources so as to solve social problems more effectively by pooling together resources, skills and knowledge. We examine the making of this social innovation through the arrangements taking in three institutional dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulative. The case study shows that the legitimacy of the agreement was based on recombining the values of fairness and solidarity. The innovation process was rooted in the exchange of knowledge and access to resources based on the expertise of actors. The agreement moved beyond the experimental framework when it was diffused as a newly learned procedure which became an organizational routine.     

When hedonic products help regulate my mood

This paper analyzes how affect mechanisms work when consumers form their attitude toward and intention to purchase a hedonic product. The first of two studies shows that when products have the potential to improve moods, affect regulation dominates affective evaluation in forming purchase intentions. In other words, the need to repair one??s mood overrides mood-congruent reviews. However, the affect regulation mechanism is not very stable, and study two shows that introducing a competing source of information, such as product reviews, overwhelms the effect. Results show that when consumers are in a bad mood, product reviews significantly influence their attitude and purchase intention regarding a hedonic product. However, this effect is not significant for consumers in a positive mood because they generate both arguments and counterarguments that compensate for the information received from a third party.     

Assessing the impact of crime on the economic performance: the case of central america

Crime is obviously a menace to economic growth and progress, but to acutely understand the enormity of its impact on economic performance for effective policy action, requires a credible means of measurement. Given the crime notoriety of the most of Central America and the struggling state of their economies, this article attempts to discern from econometric evaluation and analyses, the calculable economic impact of crime on the region’s economic progress. From analyses of results, we find the model to be credible and useful following its provision of a much more accurate degree to which crime affects economic performance in Central America, which we find critical to guide policy measures.     

Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?

The average cash-to-assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms more than doubles from 1980 to 2006. A measure of the economic importance of this increase is that at the end of the sample period, the average firm can retire all debt obligations with its cash holdings. Cash ratios increase because firms' cash flows become riskier. In addition, firms change: They hold fewer inventories and receivables and are increasingly R&D intensive. While the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in explaining the increase in cash ratios, we find no consistent evidence that agency conflicts contribute to the increase.     

Financial Globalization,Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.