Strip Clubs, “Secondary Effects” and Residential Property Prices

Municipalities regulate sexually oriented businesses (SOBs) through the “secondary effects” doctrine, which justifies limiting First Amendment speech protections inside SOBs. Negative effects of SOBs on nearby neighborhood quality are a frequently cited secondary effect. Little empirical evidence exists that SOBs generate such negative externalities. If SOBs generate negative externalities, then nearby property prices should decrease when a strip club opens. We estimate regression models of housing prices to determine the effect of new clubs on nearby residential property prices in Seattle, exploiting the termination of a 17‐year moratorium on openings and find no evidence that strip clubs have “secondary effects.”     

Bankruptcy costs, liability dollarization, and vulnerability to sudden stops

Countries with intermediate levels of institutional quality suffer larger output contractions following sudden stops of capital inflows than less developed nations. However, countries with strong institutions seldom experience significant falls in output after capital flow reversals. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors' ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy costs and the output loss following sudden stops.     

Cooperation in a risky world

We offer a novel investigation of the effect of environmental risk on cooperation in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Our baseline is the standard setting, in which the personal return from the public good is deterministic, homogeneous, and publicly known. Our experimental treatments alter this classic design by making the marginal per capita return from the public good probabilistic. In the homogeneous risk (HomR) treatment, the random draw is made for the whole group, whereas in the heterogeneous risk (HetR) treatment, this happens independently for each group member. Our hypothesis is that different environmental risks may differently affect the ex post payoff inequalities, so that other‐regarding preferences (inequality aversion) may generate higher contributions in HomR than in HetR. Our main result is that the environmental risk does not affect the patterns of cooperation either in the one‐shot or in the finitely repeated version of the game. This suggests that the standard experimental methodology provides a robust and conservative measure of human cooperation.     

Marketing Organic Pasta from Big Sandy to Rome: It's a Long Kamut ®

Bob Quinn spent 20 years propagating an ancient Egyptian wheat variety that is generally known as Khorasan wheat. Bob trademarked his wheat variety using the brand name "Kamut^®." Kamut^® brand wheat contains some nutritional, health, and taste advantages over modern wheat varieties, but lacks some of modern wheat's agronomic advantages. Kamut^® brand wheat is organically produced, and is used to make cereals, breads, cookies, snacks, pancakes, bread mixes, bulgur, pasta, and baked goods. Whole wheat products produced from Kamut^® brand wheat are less bitter than those produced from modern wheat varieties. Europe represents approximately two-thirds of the market for this product.     

Corporate social responsibility: attributions,loyalty, and the mediating role of trust

This study investigates whether consumers’ perceptions of motives influence their evaluation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. The study reveals the mediating role of consumer trust in CSR evaluation frameworks; managers should monitor consumer trust, which seems to be an important subprocess regulating the effect of consumer attributions on patronage and recommendation intentions. Further, managers may allay the negative effects of profit-motivated giving by doing well on service quality perceptions. On the other hand, appropriately motivated giving continues to positively affect trust regardless of the performance of the firm on service quality provision.