Summary This paper investigates the dynamical properties of optimal paths in one-sector overlapping generations models without assuming that the utility function of the representative agent is separable. When the utility function is separable, the optimal growth paths monotonically converges toward the modified golden rule steady state. In the non-separable case, we show that the optimal growth path may be oscillating and optimal two-period cycles may exist. Applying these results to the model with altruism, we show that the condition of operative bequest is fully compatible with endogeneous fluctuations provided that the discount factor is close enough to one. All our results are illustrated using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.We thank C. Blackorby, J. Blot, P. Cartigny and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions which generally improved the exposition of the paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the Population and demography session of the European Economic Association 10th Annual Congress (Prague, The Czech Republic, September 1–4, 1995). 相似文献
In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching. 相似文献
James Buchanan’s views on public finance have already been analyzed and they are quite well known, as are their origins and roots. However, nothing has ever been said about why Buchanan chose public finance in the first place. The first goal of this paper is to show that Buchanan had made this choice before arriving at Chicago. We show how Carlton C. Sims and Charles P. White influenced him. We also show, by analyzing Buchanan’s M.A. thesis, that he was not only interested in public finance but was also primarily concerned by ethical questions and defended a bureaucratic centralized solution to solve the problem he was discussing – how to share the benefits collected from a gasoline tax among Counties. This helps to understand that Buchanan did not choose to study public finance to learn how to fight government intervention. Quite the contrary: it was to legitimate it. Second, we also demonstrate that a lot of the ideas that will matter for Buchanan in his career – the importance of ethics and the principle of an equal treatment for equals, the need to link taxes to benefits, the importance to adapt the scale of provision of a public good to the type of public good – were already present in this first work.
With the aim of extending organisational justice research to embrace significant and enduring aspects of the workplace context, this study examines organisational culture and human resource management (HRM) as constitutive dimensions of systemic justice and relates them to employee health. Bridging organisational justice, HRM, organisational culture, and occupational health research, we advance and test a multilevel model relating systemic justice to burnout. Data collected from 60 organisations; 89 employee groups; and 1,976 employees provide support for the hypothesised relationships between justice‐oriented culture, in terms of organisational values and group culture, and justice‐oriented HRM. In turn, justice‐oriented HRM related directly to employee burnout and indirectly through employee perceived job control and supervisor social support. 相似文献
We make the point that preferences for democracy are positively correlated with level of education. This correlation is robust even after controlling for a range of personal characteristics, including country of residence, income, age, or using different definitions of preferences for democracy or using instrumental variables. Interestingly, the results hold across countries with different level of democracy. We use data from World Values Surveys and show that our results are consistent with a simple theoretical model in which education makes political accountability easier. 相似文献